Page 71 - Australian Defence Magazine October 2019
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vice date of around 2025 referred to in the 2009 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) that followed the White Paper of the same year.
It’s understood that Defence did in fact propose this early start to then-Defence Min- ister Robert Hill, who decided instead that the focus should remain on remedying prob- lems with the Collins-class fleet in being.
A Sea 1000 project office was eventu- ally established in October 2008 within the then-Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and four months later Rear Ad- miral Rowan Moffitt, author of a search- ing review into issues affecting the sustain- ability of the RAN’s submarine workforce, was appointed as its head.
As depicted in the 2009 White Paper the new “regionally-superior” submarines would be conventionally-powered and boast longer range; greater endurance; and support more missions and provide more
capabilities, including land strike, than their 3,350-tonne predecessors. In short, a prescription for a potent system beyond the capabilities of any existing diesel-elec- tric contender.
The following four years were notable for an almost total lack of political guid- ance, although the small and underfunded project office continued gathering infor- mation on Future Submarine options and assessing their technologies and relevance to Australia’s strategic circumstances.
According to informed sources, RADM Moffitt’s first meeting with the National Security Committee (NSC) of Cabinet was scheduled for November 2009, six months after publication of the White Paper.
This initial meeting was to ascertain the time by which all 12 Future Submarines were required, seek clarification of strate- gic objectives, explain the broad options
being pursued by the project office, and obtain appropriate funding.
That meeting did not take place, nor did anticipated discussions in 2010.
In May 2011 RADM Moffitt told a par- liamentary committee that a meeting with the NSC was ‘’relatively imminent” and he was ready with a range of questions that would allow the program to move forward.
Nonetheless, it was not until March 2012 that Sea 1000 was finally discussed by the NSC, which considered a submis- sion by the project office on its findings to date, its proposed methodology going forward, preliminary cost, capability and schedule, and broad risk profiles on the choice of platform.
This comprised either an entirely new design (at that time considered high risk and unlikely); a Military Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) acquisition of an existing design;
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