Page 72 - Australian Defence Magazine October 2019

PACIFIC
ATTACK CLASS
“The completion date for the 12th and final Attack-class boat will depend on the drumbeat of construction but is expected to be in the 2050s.”
modification of a MOTS platform with Australian-selected systems; or a major evolution of a MOTS design, including Collins.
By July 2014 the ambitious 2009 require- ment for a boat with significantly greater performance than Collins had been amend- ed to the absolute minimum of a boat with Collins-like range, speed and endurance, but with improved stealth and enhanced sensors.
Industry landscape
Even matching Collins’ capabilities meant Sea 1000 contenders would require a range of around 10,000 nautical miles (18,500 km) at 10 knots together with an endurance of around 70 days to deploy, remain on station and return from areas of operational interest in Northeast and Southeast Asia.
This had the effect of removing any further consideration of MOTS options (Navantia’s S-80, DCNS’ Scorpene and Germany’s HDW Type 214), all of which were assessed as unsuited to Australia’s ge- ography and the distances involved.
An artists concept of the Attack class.
the CEP got underway in late February 2015 and information-gathering contin- ued until November 2015, uninterrupted by Abbott’s displacement in September 2015 by his colleague Malcolm Turnbull and the appointment of Senator Marise Payne as Minister for Defence.
DWP 2016
A much-delayed Defence White Paper pub- lished in February 2016 restated the key strategic requirements set out in 2014. It also confirmed that upgraded versions of the AN/BYG-1 (V) tactical and weapons con- trol system and the Mk 48 Mod 7 CBASS (common broadband advanced sonar sys- tem) heavyweight torpedo, both jointly de- veloped by the US and Australia and fielded exclusively by the two countries, were pre- ferred for the combat management system and main armament.
Additionally, the White Paper stated the new submarines would also deploy advanced communications systems to link with other ships and aircraft in anti-submarine warfare operations. It did not mention the land attack cruise missile capability included in the 2009 White Paper.
Vitally, the CEP sought proposals from the three contenders for construction of the Future Submarine fleet either overseas, in Australia, and/or a hybrid approach.
A subsequent flurry of activity saw ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) pressing the case for its developmental 4,000-tonne Type 216 and DCNS of France proposing the redesign of its 5,300-tonne Barracuda-class nuclear attack submarine into a conventionally-powered platform dubbed the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A.
Saab’s takeover from TKMS in mid-2014 of Collins-class designer Kockums saw the Swedish company quickly confirm its own readiness not only to involve Australian en- gineers and technicians in the construction of its 1,900 tonne A26 submarine, but also to design a 4,000 tonne variant specifically for Sea 1000.
Meanwhile it had become apparent that Liberal Party Prime Minister Tony Abbott was pressing for an early decision in favour of Japan’s in-service 4,200 tonne Soryu class, driven by a close relationship with his
Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe and a desire to deepen stra- tegic and trade rela- tions with Tokyo.
In February 2015 the Abbott govern- ment rejected re- peated calls for an open tender, opting instead for a con- troversial 10-month
Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP) in which the French, German and Japanese contenders would compete for selection as Sea 1000’s international design partner.
Saab was not considered because its Kockums subsidiary had not built a sub- marine since 1996, said Defence Minister Kevin Andrews, the sixth holder of that position since the establishment of the Sea 1000 Project Office seven years earlier. Saab subsequently pointed out - without avail – that Kockums had actually deliv- ered six submarines since 1996, the latest of which was commissioned in 2013.
Andrews initially struggled to explain how the CEP would work, when it would take place, and what kind of cost and ca- pability considerations the government would include.
Although this early confusion was shared in both official and industry circles,
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