Page 122 - Australian Defence Magazine Feb-Mar 2023

122 DEFENCE BUSINESS VIEW FROM CANBERRA
FEBRUARY-MARCH 2023 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
VIEW FROM CANBERRA
26 June 2002 no doubt passed like most other days but should be noted in the halls of history for a government decision which shaped the modern-day ADF like few others.
A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT | CANBERRA
ON THAT day, the National Security Committee of Cabinet decided that instead of having a contest for a new RAAF combat aircraft, we would go straight to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).
OK, it wasn’t quite that straightforward, although that was the effect. The government of PM John Howard decided that Australia would sign a memorandum of understanding
with the US for membership of the JSF System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase.
Australia would become a level three partner, at a cost of $322.4 million “in cash and/or kind”.
That wasn’t the highest level – level one was the UK and level two was Italy and the Netherlands while Australia joined Turkey, Canada, Norway and Denmark in level three.
Cabinet papers for 2002 – released by the National Ar- chives of Australia under the 20-year rule – show that it gave us a seat at the table and insider access to project progress. And it opened the door for Australian industry engagement with the F-35 program.
In mid-2002, this was still four years from an aircraft actual- ly flying and much longer before any F-35 was combat capable. Aircraft AA1 took to the skies on 15 December 2006, but
the first F-35s weren’t declared ready to go to war until 2015. The submission, presented by then Defence Minister Rob- ert Hill, shows Defence was very conscious this was a highly
developmental and risky program.
With majestic understatement, it noted “there is some po-
tential that schedule slippage may occur”. Too right it did. Most significantly, Australia might need to acquire an in- terim combat capability “if a gap emerges before the JSF can
be introduced into service”.
That’s curious, as the RAAF subsequently took the view
that no interim capability would be needed.
It was down to later Defence Minister Brendan Nelson to
drive procurement of 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets to give the RAAF a strike capability between retirement of the F-111s (in 2010) and arrival of JSF.
“The availability of JSF aircraft in the 2012-2020 period is critical to the ADF’s plans for the withdrawal of the F/A-18 and F-111 fleets,” the submission says.
NIGEL PITTAWAY
It goes into fair amount of detail of the pluses and minuses of joining SDD. In 2002, the $322 million joining cost (over 12 years) was serious money which would have to be found somewhere in the Defence Capability Plan.
On the other hand, joining SDD could generate net sav- ings of $660 million, including not having to pay substantial premiums for buying through the US FMS system.
In its component of the submission, the Industry Depart- ment was strong on the benefits to Australian industry, de- claring we could not afford to forfeit this opportunity if it as- pired to lift the aerospace industry from the global margins. It suggested the share could reach A$2.5 billion over the life of the program.
Subsequently, various commentators deemed such claims overblown, declaring benefits on that scale would never eventuate.
In fact, they far exceeded expectations. Participation in the F-35 Global Supply Chain according to Lockheed Mar- tin already exceeds $3 billion and has significantly contrib- uted to the renaissance of Australian high-tech industry.
Joining SDD meant canning research then under way through project Air 6000 which hadn’t yet reached the stage of inviting various companies for proposals.
There were multiple candidates but the submission gives a clear indication that really only US candidates were in the running.
JSF and F-22 were the only “serious new-generation” con- tenders available to replace F-111 and Hornet, although F-22 was triple the price of JSF.
This submission makes no mention of one insurmountable problem with F-22 – even if it wanted to, the US couldn’t sell it to us.
That was specifically banned by an amendment to 1999 US Defense Appropriations, inserted by a politician to en- sure the US did not sell its most advanced military tech even to close allies. ■
ABOVE: Australia’s first F-35A was ceremonially handed over in the US on 24 July 2014