Page 46 - Australian Defence Magazine Nov 2018
P. 46

UNDERWATER TECHNOLOGY
UNMANNED
Submarines and manned/ unmanned teaming
NORMAN FRIEDMAN | US
Australia is about to build a new class of submarines, which will probably be in service well beyond 2050. How is their world likely
to change over that long life span? What forces are currently driving submarine technology?
WE can look back to form some idea of how technology affects submarines. A Collins class submarine, as she is currently equipped, is far more effective than she was when she was designed and built, mainly because her computer combat system is far more sophisticated. This greater capacity could be built into a submarine of fixed size and volume because the change came out of far more capable computers and their chips – out of Moore’s Law, which posits that computer power doubles every 18 months, if not more frequently. As currently con- figured, the Collins class (like US subma- rines) can be upgraded periodically as com- puter power continues to grow, a process the US Navy calls ARCI – Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion.
Here the point is that commercial (COTS) hardware, which is less and less expensive, gives the system the potential to use more and more powerful software. At the end of the Cold War the US Navy realized that it could not afford a new-generation sonar ar- ray – but given ARCI it could make far bet- ter use of what it had and could buy. Simi- larly, the Collins class was built with a set of sonar arrays which is difficult to change – but processing is another matter.
This trend is likely to continue for some time; it is by no means clear how and when Moore’s Law, like all other expressions of technical growth, will peter out. Similarly, the Collins class is currently armed with a far more powerful torpedo than it had at the outset. The change in torpedoes was rel- atively simple because submarine fire con- trol was software-based and could therefore be modified inexpensively.
What comes next? Submarines are in- creasingly expensive, both to buy and to operate. They are valued because they are, in effect, invisible, as nothing else in the de- fence world is. That seems likely to continue, particularly if Australian submarines often operate in coastal areas in which submarine detection is even more difficult than in the open ocean. Invisibility makes submarine reconnaissance, generally sopping up radio
signals, an extremely important mission. A potential target is generally aware of satel- lite orbits, for example, and may shut down crucial communications when they are in range. That applies even more strongly to nearly all airplanes, manned and unmanned.
An invisible submarine offshore is a very different proposition. Moreover, it has the capacity to make sense of what it picks up, and therefore to adjust its surveillance ac- cordingly. Australia in particular relies heavily on intelligence for security, because the country wields a relatively small but ex- tremely sophisticated defense force. It has to be in the right place when needed.
Force multiplier
A very expensive submarine can be in only one place at a time – or is that true? In the past it certainly was true, but the emerging class of unmanned vehicles, both airborne and underwater, promise something more. For example, one might imagine a submarine offshore launching a cloud of expendable miniature air vehicles to listen to radio signals and transmit back to the submarine.
The cloud can cover a much larger area than the submarine’s own surveillance re- ceivers, attached to the submarine. It can also be offset sufficiently that even if the surveil-
46 | November 2018 | www.australiandefence.com.au


































































































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