Page 27 - Chiron Autumn 2017

a pace of 4 miles an hour including halts (rest breaks) even for long journeys.
• Transportation of wagons and ambulances were paced at 3 mph including halts.
• On the march mules, can be led or driven, the latter being the most usual method. This was undertaken by a trained driver or muleteer, usually from the Indian or Macedonian Mule Corps.
• Rest was important and halts took place at regular intervals:
• After 1 to 2 miles to check load carriage, that harnesses and saddles t correctly and tighten goods. This normally just took a few minutes;
• Every hour a stop for 5 to 10 minutes to rest;
• Every 2 to 3 hours a longer break to off-saddle and feed.
• Trained mules could be trusted to carry bulky loads on narrow roads and steep hills safely and would move independently once loaded at an enduring pace of 3 to 4 mph including halts.
• They will cover anything between 20 and 25 miles each day even in mountainous terrain.
• A mule could carry weights of between 300 – 380lbs (130-170kg). For ordnance mules, that equated to5-660lbsshellsor16-2018lbs shells. In modern terms that would be an average man of 85 kg plus all their man portable kit and bergen. For infantry mortar teams this would equate to 17 ‘greenies’ or mortar bombs in their primary packaging.
Both present day and WW1 doctrine refers to the use of mules as a recognised means of ef cient transport in mountain operations. It speaks about the use of mules and tactics employed to resist the threats encountered. Only men and mule trains in single le elongated groups could navigate the narrow tracks which followed steep sided valleys or extended precariously along ridges. Although this presented a small target to the front, the broad ank and limitations placed on command and control, provided ample opportunities for enemy ambush or attack. When combined with a lack of freedom of manoeuvre if attacked or shelled, together with the dangers of icy tracks or poor visibility gave those that held the high ground supreme advantage.
Soldiers accounts recorded during the Salonica campaign paint a vivid picture of the dif cult conditions these men experienced.
Taken from an account by Lieutenant Colonel W E Johnson (5th Royal Irish Fusiliers) on typical conditions on the Kosturino Ridge, winter 1915 “The dif culties of transport were colossal; amongst the mountain fastness roads were unknown – mere donkey tracks, running in some places almost perpendicularly, had served the purpose of the inhabitants... The transport personnel suffered untold hardship and misery.
All loads had to be carried on pack mules, and supplies had to be taken by them at night over uncertain mountain paths where a false step on the frozen ground would very often have meant certain death...’ Another account talks of the road being “a mass of mud which made marching 6 miles feel like 15 and
how these routes were impassable to anything but a mule”.
Therefore, the lengthy supply and communication lines along the 90-mile British frontline provided the imperative for an effective means of transport i.e. this meant availability and reliability to complete the task of moving vital stores such as food, water, ammunition and medical supplies and removing casualties and the dead.
This made horses and mules extremely valuable – to quantify this, it was often heard to be said that a mule or a horse was more valuable than a soldier. This was because men were replaceable while a horse or mule was not. In fact,
Headstone of Pte LW Horton, an RAVC Soldier who died during service in the Salonika Campaign, 7 October 1916.
Mule drawn sleigh carrying supplies over muddy area – Salonika Frontline, January 1917.
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