Page 122 - Wish Stream Year of 2019

British Lead Staff Ride to Salerno
The Joint Force Commands (JFC) at Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (The Netherlands) represent NATO’s operational level of com- mand. These four-star headquarters deliver advance planning, command and control of Allied operations at the campaign level. Mul- tinational staff within the JFCs are trained and prepared to deliver collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security opera- tions as directed by the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
With the support of The Sandhurst
Trust, senior officers and staff of
JFC Naples recently sought to
broaden their understanding of
the operational level war by con-
ducting a ‘Staff Ride’ of the WW2 Allied landings around Salerno, Southern Italy, in September 1943. A Staff Ride in the multinational NATO environment provides a unique opportunity to gain perspectives from senior Service person- nel from the 29 NATO nations. Their viewpoints allow us to understand the contemporary appli- cation of doctrinal lessons and realise the vis- ceral, practical business of war and ‘operational art’. They are also great for teambuilding and are encouraged at all units.
‘Op Avalanche’ saw the US 5th Army (including UK 10th Corps) conduct an amphibious land- ing to open up a new front in Europe and further stretch Axis forces. Ultimately, even with the ini- tiative, supremacy at sea/air and a clear numeri- cal advantage, Allied forces failed to achieve the rapid seizure of Italy anticipated and Op Ava- lanche was the beginning of one of the hardest fought campaigns in military history: the fight up
the narrow Italian peninsular from Salerno to the Alps.
As much a lesson in the Manoeu- vrist Approach and Joint Action, Op Avalanche was a lesson in leadership and the frictions which may come about as a result of the personali- ties of commanders and the influ-
ence of external factors. General Mark Clark, Commander of the 5th US Army, exemplified this. Central to command of coalition forces is an appreciation of differing national leadership styles and philosophies; this isn’t any different at the tactical level. The higher commander’s intent must take primacy over all other external influ- ences but for Clark, personal ambition, percep- tions of US forces and the role he felt they should play sometimes took precedence over achieving Allied objectives. This hampered the cohesive effort essential for success, especially at Cassino
They are also great for teambuilding and are encouraged at all units.
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