Page 8 - MERCIAN Eagle 2011

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thorough knowledge of the AO’s pattern
of life. Secondly, a robust Surveillance
& Target Acquisition Plan (or STAP) was used to pin point the Insurgents’ activities, understand their intent and effectively plan patrols and surveillance against this. One of the other difficulties was the physical terrain. The insurgents would emplace IEDs in areas where troops could be channelled, or close to key locations such as Mosques, or roads or alleyways near inhabited compounds.
As such, foot ptls around the AO required the use of ladders; “Grand-Nationalling” or Cross-Graining. This meant clearing around the sides of
FOB Wishtan where the Company Medical Officer would undertake the difficult task of coordinating and treating the casualties and preparing them for CASEVAC by Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) to the Role 3 Hospital in Camp Bastion.
The first months of the tour were more kinetic in comparison to the others. As the Company looked to extend its footprint,
to put the insurgent on the back foot, the insurgent fought back. Using the maze of alleyways and compounds, as well as a permissive local population, the insurgents in Wishtan would seek to move out of
that freedom of movement between two of its three locations was good. Often, Rifle Companies in Afghanistan are broken down into numerous PBs with poor freedom of movement between them. A Company were lucky and this helped cement the bond not just within Platoons but the Company as a whole. Time not on patrol was spent “on stag” either in Sangars or in the Ops Rooms of the respective locations, or relaxing. Music, PT, cooking, smoking, sleeping and reading would probably encompass the majority of pastimes that members of the Company used to kill the inevitable hours of boredom and extreme heat. However, continual refresher training was carried out to prevent any skill fade
or sloppiness that may have set in. The best part of any down time would be the arrival of post, via helicopters. Whether
it was letters or parcels, any arrival was met with a noticeable increase in morale. Morale was not just confined to the arrival of post. Any new arrival to Wishtan would be invited to relax in the smoking area, only to find “Grand-Nationalling” put to its best use - a ladder, a bucket of water and a very “refreshing” break to the Afghan heat poured from above!
July saw a change in 3 Platoon with CSgt Borlace handing over to Lt Rice, who had up to this point been in Lashkar Gah on a Police Mentoring Task. It was at this time that the Insurgents started to continue their increased IED activity, pushing further and further in towards the FOB. Sadly on the 8th of July, Bombardier Sam Robinson, a team commander in 4/73 Battery, 5th Regt R.A, was killed in an explosion East of the FOB, and two of his colleagues wounded. This area had become a focus of insurgent
compounds, crossing
over 15-20ft high
mud walls with over
watch from soldiers
on ladders nearby,
and then continuing
on the other side to
the next wall, and on
until the objective....
a laborious, tiring and
time consuming process, but one that reduced the risk of Vulnerable Areas or Points (VAs/VPs). Patrols required ISTAR, and other supporting patrols, to provide flank security and surveillance in depth to prevent Insurgent action against a ground Call-Sign.
The final difficulty, but one which
drove everything that A Company did,
was Casualty Evacuation or CASEVAC. CASEVAC in an urban environment is already acknowledged as a difficult task, but throw in an aggressive IED Screen, a maze of high walled compounds with minimal entry or exit points and only one suitable HLS in the AO and the process becomes far more problematic. The Wishtan QRF, as it became known, perfected this technique. Patrols would have Engineers embedded, as would the QRF who were mounted on Jackals. When the call came through that casualties had been sustained, the QRF commander, CSM Henry would confirm the route that the patrol would start extracting casualties on. He would brief the QRF, and they would then move to the nearest point accessible by vehicle to the CASEVAC route. The patrol and the QRF would then proceed to move back using Explosive Method of Entry (EMOE) through compound walls until a Casualty Exchange point
could be reached. Here the QRF would take over the casualty and extract him to
Pte Bramall and Cpl Buckley on patrol in Wishtan
sight into a position of advantage. Primarily, attacks would come from either medium distance shoots using alleyways and murder holes to engage patrols, or through close range grenade attacks.
Using the high walls
to defeat our ISTAR coverage and patrols arcs, they would seek
to use the local population to move within an alleyway’s distance before throwing grenades over walls, often strapped to RPG warheads in an attempt to inflict greater damage. Unfortunately on two occasions in June they had success, with both Ranger Moffet, a TA Augmentee, and Sgt Moitt being CASEVAC’ed back to Camp Bastion with serious injuries. This first period also saw A Company’s lowest point. Operating out of PB Chakaw, Cpl Harvey Holmes was tragically killed at the start of May by an explosion whilst in overwatch to the south of the AO providing cover for a patrol. This loss was felt intensely by everyone, but had the effect of steeling A
The insurgents would emplace IED’s in areas where troops could be channelled
Company to take the
fight further and harder
against the insurgent.
The Company patrolled
extensively throughout
this time, clearing
numerous IEDs with
the assistance of the
Royal Engineers Search
Team (REST), engaging
extensively with the
population and denying
the enemy freedom of
movement through extensive patrolling and accurate, aggressive action in contacts. In June, Pte White, Pte Pywell and Lt Cooke were injured in IED blasts, incidents that were indicative of the Insurgents’ tactics within Wishtan. Realising that normal kinetic activity would not be enough; the Insurgent increased what was already intensive IED activity and sought to restrict the Company’s freedom of movement. June also saw A Company assist in an incredibly traumatic incident where a US Blackhawk helicopter was downed by enemy fire at FOB Jackson. Those that helped respond did so with great courage and calm resolve to help those on board.
A Company were unusual in Sangin in
activity as the enemy realised they could move with greater freedom here. This resulted in a number of contacts on to patrols working through this part of the AO. On 19th July, Pte Hewitt was very seriously injured whilst on a patrol to reassure Local Nationals who were living in amongst some of the
most prolific IED activity.
The rest of July saw a spike in kinetic
activity, with attacks against PB Tangiers increasing. A Coy continued to maintain
its footprint, however by this time we had been informed that the USMC did not want to maintain FOB Wishtan and as such ours would be the last ISAF presence in the AO (a decision that would be overturned shortly after 3/7 Marines’ arrival and realisation of the importance of the Wishtan area). Whilst this was disappointing, it meant that we
had an end point, and knew what we could achieve in the time left. At the end of July, Sgt Kershaw had been injured when his Jackal had been struck by an IED, and so Lt Rice would move out to PB Chakaw along
June also saw A Company assist in an incredibly traumatic incident where a US Blackhawk helicopter was downed by enemy fire at FOB Jackson
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