Page 22 - The Cormorant Issue 14

Many other Pashtuns, including refugees from Afghanistan, now live in Pakistan’s southern port city of Karachi, which is said to be the world’s largest Pashtun city.
But what, spread out as they are, makes the Pashtun so special? Why did the British Raj rely upon them so heavily as a source of soldiery at the time of The Great Game?
There was never any doubt about their toughness and warlike spirit. But the British administrator Sir Denzil Ibbetson in 1883 evidently did not have a high regard for them. In his Census Report for the Punjab, he declared: ‘The true Pathan is perhaps the most barbaric of races.... in the Punjab.....he is bloodthirsty, cruel, and vindictive in the highest degree.....; and though he is not without courage of a sort and is often curiously reckless of his life, he would scorn to face an enemy whom he could stab from behind.’ It seems to have been Ibbetson who disseminated the highly dubious notion that the Pushtun makes no distinc- tion between a ‘cousin’ and an ‘enemy’ since, he claimed, the Pashto word tarbur was used indifferently for the two.
Others, however, have been more dispassionate about Pashtun characteristics. In the early 1970’s the American anthropologist and Afghanistan specialist Louis Dupree collected and summa- rised what he judged to be the main generally accepted features of the Pashtun tribal code, or Pashtunwali. This code amounts to a collection of long-established ethical and customary norms of communal life. Although it has been eroded in recent decades, the obligations remain relevant today and have and impact of tribal attitudes towards military and other operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Notable within Pashtunwali were individual and collective obliga- tions to:
• Avenge blood (badal), an obligation which, as has been well documented, can persist over generations until fulfilled or otherwise assuaged.
• Fight to the death for a person who has taken refuge with one, regardless of that person’s lineage (nanawati).
Indian Foreign Policy
By Dr Gareth Price
In April 2011 India released its national security index, which rated the country the world’s fifth most powerful (after the US, China, Japan and Russia). On any measure that involves popu- lation, the world’s second-most populous country will come out well. But the ranking, by Indian experts, demonstrates a rapid increase in India’s own sense of importance.
Over the past decade other countries have sought to deepen their ties with India, and Indian self-confidence has also grown on the back of two decades of strong economic growth. But while many Indians are pleased with the country’s growing global recognition, others are more sanguine. The former head of the Ministry of External Affairs, Shyam Saran, recently noted that:
“Not so long ago India only evoked poverty and mysticism. Now the country’s name is invoked as a kind of poster child of globali- sation whose fast growth makes it a world leader. If the earlier view was oversimplified, so is the current one. The latest phase of globalisation has certainly propelled India forward, but the
• Be hospitable and provide for the safety of the persons and property of guests (melmastia).
Running through these and other aspects of the code are notions of honour, bravery, manliness, chivalry, steadfastness and right- eousness. Consistent with their calling as warriors, tribes main- tain arsenals of arms and ammunition for use in tribal and other feuds. Every tribesman considers it his inalienable right to carry arms from childhood.
Louis Dupree describes Pashtunwali as a ‘tough code for tough men who, of necessity, live tough lives’. This was reaffirmed by the former head of the ISI’s Afghan Bureau, Mohammad Yousaf, who mentored Mujahideen from 1983 to 1987 during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan: ‘Even a jihad does not stop badal’; ‘Physical courage is central to the Afghan character.’
Just as Soviet troops were regarded as intruders who violated the sanctity of qaum or the homeland, who must be killed if they draw blood, so this applies to Western forces who operate there now. Similarly, the nanawati principle of sanctuary is often invoked in relation to Afghan Taliban or Pakistani militants who entered the FATA and other tribal regions when fleeing from pur- suers in Afghanistan. When considered alongside the millennia- old traditions of crossing the Durand Line for trade, smuggling and for visiting family members in villages which the Line splits, and the general detestation of strangers of any nature, the clear difficulties over the last decade of rooting out ‘the bad guys’ may be put into a more realistic perspective. A Pashtun need not be a Taliban, a religious fanatic, or a follower of Mullah Omar to respond in such a fashion. Nor, whatever inducement may be offered or accepted, will he necessarily be very susceptible to ‘reconciliation or reintegration’ if he considers himself to have been wronged. No one who has served in front line operations in Afghanistan will need any reminder of the legendary toughness.
Sir Hilary Synott was an eminent diplomat and academic. Most recently a consulting Senior Fellow at the International Insti- tute for Strategic Studies, he was a good friend of the JSCSC. Very sadly, he passed away on 08 September 2011.
Nation is still far from assuming the world responsibility that its economic advance seems to suggest. For all its progress, India remains a ‘premature power’.”
Like Shyam Saran, a larger number of policy-makers believe that India will play a global role when it has resolved its own domes- tic development challenges. Should it fail to do so, questions of India’s global role will be irrelevant.
Thus, foreign policy is something of a niche issue among Indian policy-makers. Its higher levels of engagement in global forums appeals to the emerging, and bullish, middle class. But decision- makers are more domestically focussed.
While other countries hope that India will play a greater role, its ability to do so faces challenges. Among these is the small size of its foreign ministry. While other countries hope for India to become a more “strategic” partner, its diplomats are more com- monly focussed on arranging visits than on developing long-term
20