Page 166 - Chronicle Vol 17

Royal Navy was nowhere to be seen and the evacuating ships would not arrive for a further three days. Moore began planning his defence and the logistics of get- ting his army offshore and away to safety. They had endured the harsh weather and relentless attacks from the French with the 95th Rifles being actively engaged in the rearguard during the long withdrawal through the mountains. Moore knew it was a matter of time before Marshal Soult was upon him, he also knew trying to fight while his army boarded the ships would be disastrous. The British army was split, with a force sent up to the hill tops surrounding the port and the rest moved south down the shoreline into the Spanish village of Elvina. This was done for mainly two reasons. It provided a better position to defend from and allowed an escape route to the port. This is where we will analyse one of the key principles of a withdrawal the “security”. The battle first began when the British Forces on the hilltops were engaged by a group of 500 French soldiers on the night of the 15th of January 1809. Who were able to push back the already fatigued soldiers and drive them off the hilltops. The British were already fighting a losing battle when on the following day the French leader, Soult, launched his great assault. It is easy to see why the French at the time would use this as evidence to support a claim that the battle was a French victory. However, in the bigger picture this was a small victory and although Soult may have gained some key terrain, seizing the hilltops would have no effect on the bulk of the force that stood firm in the village of Elvina. The security of Moore’s army was still in place around Elvina which was tactically a prized location. I would argue that the push back from the hilltops served only to boost the French Morale. Through research and understanding I have concluded that it wouldn’t have made any change operationally to the bat- tle at all. The hills seemed to only serve as a platform for Marshal Soult to survey the British Forces on the docks. Soult may have seen the hilltops as key terrain but in the context of the battle it made no difference to the British Army down in the village. As a result, this initial French victory had no impact on the security of Moore’s defence, having taken no vital ground. This should not be viewed as a French success.
Another key principle that allowed the British to be so successful in their with- drawal was the dedication to offensive action. This directly impacted the battle.
A rifleman of the 95th at the battle of Corunna
165