Page 409 - The History of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps 1962–2021

THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS 1962 – 2021
von Rennenkampff, hosted us for the afternoon and gave us both a very detailed tour of the stable block, riding school, forge, and veterinary facility. The Troop consisted of some one hundred and thirty men; this was split down into a HQ, the two platoons, eight farriers and the veterinary staff. They are currently supporting operations in Kosovo and are preparing in earnest to deploy to Afghanistan early next year.
An extremely beneficial contact has been made. We hope to explore the possibility of some joint training later in the year with both MWD and mules, working at altitude and in extremes of temperature. Special thanks to the Commanding Officer and the men of 230 Mountain Pack Troop for hosting and looking after us so well. The visit proved again that Pack is a simple yet effective method of transporting supplies to extreme locations; with the plethora of proposals for deployment to Afghanistan in 2006, maybe an old skill needs dusting off again.61
Afghanistan (2001 – 2021):
The conflict in Afghanistan brought all aspects of the British Army’s tactical ability into focus – including Pack Transport. It triggered a review of the times when Pack animals had succeeded where technology had failed – a reminder too, that animals can be a useful vehicle in winning hearts and minds.
In the British Army Review (spring 2011) Major James Cook RA RMAS62 wrote:
A New Means of Tactical Mobility for Afghanistan
Throughout history, military campaigns have been fought from horses. The animal has provided outstanding mobility in all terrains, and in all climates, and has been at its best when the fighting has been fierce.63 Both TE Lawrence, in his ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom’, and the contemporary commentator Dr David Kilcullen, in his ‘Twenty-Eight Articles on Insurgency’, state that there is a common thread of “meeting the people on equal terms”. The challenge remains that the insurgent threat drives soldiers into protected vehicles which alienates the population we are trying to secure which could be mitigated by the use of horses, mules, or donkeys in SOME part of the Afghan campaign.
The Advantage in Using Horses: Conducting such a complex Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan has forced the British forces to develop many new Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). The solution for manoeuvre has been to improve our Protected Mobility (PM) vehicle fleet. However, this has hidden our troops inside armoured vehicles away from the contact the
population so desperately need. Once these vehicles discharge their troops into the surrounding area, the initially disorientated troops patrol on foot into the vicinity of the population and usually the enemy. This method plays into the hands of the insurgents. The PM vehicles are easy to follow, have relatively poor surveil- lance, are ponderous, restricted by bridge classification and road conditions and are easy to channel. Horse mounted troops would not be as physically constrained as they exploit their excellent situational awareness and avoid the awkward minutes of disorientation when entering new environments.
In his field notes, Twenty-Eight Articles, Dr David Kilcullen refers to the overarching principles that will help secure success in a counter insurgency. The issues he considers have now been absorbed into American Doctrine.64 Firstly, he is adamant that patrols should “travel light and harden your CSS”. He states that, “you will be weighed down with body armour, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other things”. In comparison the enemy will carry a rifle or RPG, a shemagh and a water bottle, if he is lucky. His final statement on the issue is: “unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and out-manoeuvre you”. This seems an excellent reason for using the horse or mule as they allow you to out manoeuvre the enemy, carry more equipment and be fresher when you enter close quarter combat.65
His second premise is that you must “practise deterrent patrolling and establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you”. By being mounted and exploiting the mobility of the horse there is probably no better way of conducting deterrent patrolling and being able to engage with the population simultane- ously. Lastly, he summarises that the counter insurgent must “keep the initiative as in counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment”. In this way, using a novel means of mobility will buy the commander time in which the insurgent is unbalanced and has to try to develop new TTPs. These are rare opportunities and could be exploited to our advantage.
The importance of manoeuvre, load carriage and tactical mobility has been considered by the Infantry for the last four years. The ‘Infantry Force Development Recommendations paper 2008’ identified that the load burden placed upon those that patrol on foot in Afghanistan is excessive. The weights regularly exceed what is practicable, slow the soldier down, reduce overall mobility, lead to early onset of fatigue and cause
61 Chiron Calling dated Summer 2005.
62 A New Means of Tactical Mobility for Afghanistan by Major James Cook RA RMAS, British Army Review No 151 dated Spring 2011.
63 Warner, Philip. The British Cavalry. JM Dent and Sons. 1984.
64 Counter Insurgency Manual 3-24 3.
65 Dr David Kilcullen. Twenty-Eight Articles. Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency. Washington, D.C. 29th March, 2006.
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