Page 414 - The History of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps 1962–2021

THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS 1962 – 2021
association the UK Armed Forces are risk averse.91 As mounting troops on horses carries perceived risk, as it is something new, the greatest threat to success is initial misunderstanding and risk aversion by Commanders. The risk aversion from both ministers and military leaders will predominantly come from the perception that the media will not favour such a concept. The decision makers may judge that to employ nineteenth century transport is a retrograde step. In terms of horse robustness and ability to withstand injury, accounts from the First World War of cavalry action against machine guns show that horses would charge at defended positions. They would take several direct hits to the chest and neck but carrying on galloping at the enemy. It was only when the action was over and the adrenalin stopped that horses began to suffer, sometimes dying on the spot, but more likely needing veterinary attention having shown a high coping ability with ballistic injury.92
Why it will work. Unlike bringing new equipments into service, there is no technical risk with horses. The system is proven, it has no specific untested technology and the complete system is robust, experienced, and tried. There will be no additional development of the techno- logical capability and therefore no loss of capability or change in operating methods as deployments develops. There are no proprietary ownership issues nor are there any international negotiations over release of classified equipments or parts thereof. Thirdly, the UK Armed Forces own the entire equipment, training facilities, man power and expertise already. Unlike virtually any other capability, horses will need no expensive simulator, no extensive networked capability, they will not require security clearance to deploy and they will not be tempted to sell their story to the media. Fourthly, as has been explained in the social status of the horse, the Afghan people will undoubtedly welcome mounted soldiers. There will be a natural affinity and everyone from the local elders to children will be fascinated by a means of transport that they can relate to and importantly, not be afraid of, but rather in awe of. Lastly, and most prophet- ically, it should not be forgotten that horses have been a means of transport in battle for thousands of years.
It is only the last seventy-five years that the horse has largely disappeared from the battlefield. Prior to that, every campaign in every environment and in every circumstance owed its manoeuvre to soldiers on horseback. Whether it was for moving the élites of the battlefield around, moving stores, cannons or for Dragoons and Hussars, the horse has been developed for decisive warfare, is designed to withstand battle, is hardy and keen. The horse maintains an aura of elegance and
nobility; it has mystique, presence, and an ability to “influence” the enemy.
It is too easy to find fault with a proposal to use horses/mules in Afghanistan. Do we really want to add to our logistic burden in theatre? We would have to build stabling, source fodder, set up a veterinary hospital, transport the animals into theatre, perhaps have to transport them within theatre. We could go on finding reasons, or are they excuses, to squash this idea. Or is the real reason that we are frightened of failure? We would be setting ourselves up to be a laughing stock if it failed, and that might be the real reason to dismiss the concept.
It is the unfamiliarity which frightens. People think they know about horses because they have watched the Grand National or they pass Horse Guards daily. This superficial knowledge is enough to comfortably reject. Yet horses survived in combat; more tonnage of fodder was moved to the Western Front than artillery ammunition. This proposal justifies as much constructive scrutiny as the technological solutions. If this is impractical why is it practical to load a soldier with 65Kg+ and expect him to fight?
We know that the weight soldiers carry in Afghanistan is damaging their bodies. Some soldiers will suffer life-long injuries to muscles, ligaments, and joints simply by carrying excessive loads. This cannot be right. We should not accept that we no longer do the manoeuvre bit of fire and manoeuvre because of the weight, and we should not accept this inevitable damage to our soldiers.
There are two things we can do: one is to buy the lighter equipment – it exists, it costs. But so does biffing Tomahawks at Libya; where is the morality in expending hugely expensive munitions to protect some Libyans, whilst refusing to spend money to protect our own British soldiers from damage? And the second is to look critically at any proposal that will aid our cause in Afghanistan – this proposal to use horses deserves no less.
The argument for using Pack Transport in modern warfare continued to rumble on alongside the war in Afghanistan. Those faithful to the belief that horses and mules still had a role to play in 21st century warfare never shied away from an opportunity to promote the Pack animal. In the British Army Review of spring 2016 the following article acted as a reminder that we can never be entirely sure what demands any future conflict will have on our military resources.
Major David J Puckey RLC Regional Command,
91 Speech delivered by Minister of State for the Armed Forces at the Institute of Public Policy Research on 13th January 2010.
92 Griffith P. British Fighting Methods in the Great War.
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