Page 475 - The History of the Royal Army Veterinary Corps 1962–2021

THE HISTORY OF THE ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS 1962 – 2021
Command (South West) Headquarters. This is likely to be a theme of many debates on the British military presence in Afghanistan.8
At the end of 2014 all combat roles for British troops ceased.9Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have assumed complete responsibility for security in Helmand and a much smaller training-based mission remains in Afghanistan, centred back on Kabul (Operation TORAL). The longer-term effectiveness of the ANSF in Helmand will be the measure by which the legacy of the UK military presence in Afghanistan will most likely be judged. Under testing transitional conditions and an exact redeployment timetable there should be measured acknowledgement of the huge and honourable achievements at the land tactical levels of the formations, units, commanders, officers, sailors, marines, soldiers and airmen/airwomen who all played their part in giving Afghanistan more than a fighting chance of achieving stability and development.
From humble beginnings, mission specific training grew to a lengthy, highly engineered and highly centralised delivery pipeline. Significant investment delivered through Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs), saw a massive uplift in capabilities from force protection platforms, through Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnais- sance (ISR) to personnel equipment. In-theatre architecture (buildings and CIS) became well found and resourced. Collectively, these developments allowed a range of complex capabilities (such as precision/strike) to be grouped or accessible at a lower tactical level than had previously been the case.
The operation also saw step change improve- ments in joint and coalition working: with partners across the government; with the joint community through air/land integration and close cooperation with agencies, in particular in delivering Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and targeting; and with NATO, ranging from the improved subordination of UK forces to in-theatre command and control to combined operations alongside the USMC in Helmand.10 The British military approach adapted radically, from Counter-Insurgency (COIN), through its conduct of operations, to the prioriti-
sation and delivery of capacity building – where OMLTs, partnering and advisory groups and Security Force Assistance cumulatively set the conditions for transition in 2014.11
The transformational nature of Operation HERRICK on Land Forces has been striking, accelerating capability delivery through UORs, up-skilling the force, and conditioning it to deliver integrated tactical operations in a complex context amongst the people of Afghanistan. CGS has observed that:
...never in history have we rolled out a force so specifically taut for a purpose...We came out of it with a modernised force.12
By 2014, security had been transferred by UK forces to Afghanistan forces, which themselves had been transformed by UK capacity building (the development of 3/125 Corps, Afghanistan National Army (ANA), over the course of the campaign has been impressive).13 UK operations improved security within the Government Development Zone, enabled governance and civic infrastructure and wider improvements in health and education. They have been delivered despite capable opponents, significant – at times, severe – resource constraints, an inhospitable climate and conditions of great adversity.14
But it has come at a cost. During the campaign four hundred and fifty-three British troops were killed, six hundred and fifteen were seriously or very seriously, wounded and two thousand, one hundred and eighty-seven were classified as wounded in action.15 As at 2014 the UK had spent £37 billion on the campaign and this was predicted to rise to £40 billion by 2020.16 The fighting spirit of this generation of British forces was tested and proven. We have an Army that is resilient, self-con- fident, combat hardened and in which many individuals have demonstrated both superb profes- sionalism and conspicuous bravery. Its collective and individual moral compass has held firm.
It is comfortable with mission command, accom- plished at COIN/stabilisation, a wide range of mounted and dismounted close combat skills (including combat medicine), aspects of air manoeuvre and adaptability. Sustaining those and other strengths will be the challenge, especially in
8 See ‘Our Failure in Afghanistan Must be Exposed’ by Richard Williams, Times On-line 28th October 2014.
9 ‘Flag Change’ at Camp Bastion/Leatherneck took place on 26th October 2014.
10 Part of the NATO (ISAF) Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT.
11 OMLT – (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team); BAG – (Brigade Advisory Group); PMAG – (Police Mentoring and Advisory Group).
12 General Sir Peter Anthony Wall, GCB, CBE, 2013.
13 3/215 Corps ANA was the principal ANA partner for TFH.
14 For a synopsis of achievements in Afghanistan see The Army’s Experience in Afghanistan.
15 www.gov.uk/goverment/uploads/systems/uploads/attachment-data/file/355456/20140918op herrickcasuality_tables_upto_31_Aug_14.pdf accessed
31st October 2014.
16 This figure includes development funding as well as military spending- www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/11144612/Afghanistan
accessed 7th Oct 2014.
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