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equipment (less rations, which might cause hardship to the Kelpers). 3. Personnel.
Plan: In the knowledge that there was almost certainly some element of the civilian population still remaining on the island, the operation had to be planned accordingly, hence the avoidance of the destruction of rations and deliberately flexible because of the lack of hard intelligence, which could only be provided by recce. The plan was to insert the whole Sqn by Sea King onto the LS secured by 17 Tp. 17 Tp would then be used as guides to take 18 Tp to attack the airfield and 16 Tp to clear the settlement. 19 Tp would remain in reserve in the area of GR 210105, where a mortar base-plate was to be set up and would also be used as a pick-up point once the operation was completed. NGS was to be used as a means of initiating the attack, the first target being a diversion and thereafter on call in support of the attack. HMS GLAMORGAN (NGLO Lt Col K R H Eve RA) was tasked to provide the fire and NGFO5 to direct it. Due to the shortage of aircraft space I was the only member of my team that could be included in Sqn HQ. I agreed a fireplan with OC D Squadron. The whole op had to be completed during the hours of darkness so that all ships could be in a safe position by dawn.
Execution: After a delay of 24 hrs due to problems on the recce, the insertion was made at Phillips Cove, some 7 km SE of the objectives at 0330 hrs on the morning of 15 May. The Sqn moved on foot to the area of GR 209103, where the mortar was set up at 0615 hrs. 18 Tp had navigation problems, so they became the reserve while 19 Tp moved forward towards the airfield. 16 Tp moved to the edge of the settlement and Sqn HQ took up a position equidistant between the two. Everyone was in their FUPs by 0700 hrs and HMS GLAMORGAN reported ready on Fireplan ANTARCTIC FOX. At this stage OC D Sqn changed his fire support requirement from an HE diversion to illumination of the objectives. This I provided by a continuous illumination mission onto ZJ 5007, which was very successful as it sky- lined the aircraft on the runway, which was about 500 metres NE of the settlement. Because of the shortage of time, 16 Tp were unable to clear the
HMS Yarmouth ‘underway’ on 5 June 1982
settlement and instead took up a cut-off covering the track between the settlement and the airfield should the enemy attempt to reinforce the latter. Under the illumination, 19 Tp were able to identify their targets and started to move forward. At the same time I commenced an HE barrage down the ridge from ZJ 5007 towards the airfield, as the ground dominated the objectives and was an obvious position for enemy defences, which could have inflicted serious casualties on 19 Tp. The whole of the ridge was neutralised by spreading fire. I checked fire just as 19 Tp reached the edge of the airfield without having come under any enemy fire. They then set about destroying the aircraft with charges, 40mm, 66mm and GPMG fire. During this time one enemy position on the airfield engaged elements of 19 Tp, who returned fire and silenced the enemy. All 11 aircraft and considerable fuel and ammunition on the airfield were destroyed with only one minor casualty to our own forces, sustained when the enemy command-detonated an explosive charge buried underground on the edge of the airfield. The entire Sqn then withdrew to the mortar base-plate position in time to be picked up and returned to HMS HERMES by Sea King.
Conclusion: This was a highly successful op all round, which could only have been improved if given more time. Fire from HMS GLAMORGAN was accurate and tight, and the response to the change of requirements was very fast. The recce had not pinpointed any enemy positions other than the aircraft and therefore, as I saw it, the most sensible use of NGS was to neutralise the area which dominated the airfield. Although it was impossible to say whether any specific targets were hit, subsequent Argentine reports give much more credit to the effect of NGS than I could claim. Between the Pebble Island Raid (14/15 May) and Landing Force ops, a further 4 bombardments were carried out by HMS GLAMORGAN as part of Op TORNADO. During this she fired a further 446 salvos, but these were unspotted because the LOs and FO teams were all busy cross-decking and preparing for the landing. During Op TORNADO, 7 different ships carried out 15 bombardments and fired 1,128 salvos. All but 2 ships were damaged in the process.
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