Page 40 - ABA Salvoes 1999-2024

GULF WAR – OP GRANBY A 148 BATTERY PERSPECTIVE
By Major A S Harvey RA
The Gulf Conflict started with the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq on the 2nd of August 1990, and finished with the liberation of Kuwait on the 28th of February 1991, with an official cease-fire on the 11th of April 1991. The bombing of Iraq started on the 16th of January 1991 and the coalition ground offensive began on the 24th of February 1991. 148 Battery’s involvement started as a result of a visit to the Gulf by myself and Sgt Steve Richardson in November 1990 to carry out NGS serials with HMS Gloucester and HMS Manchester. On completion of these serials we took the opportunity to visit HQ 1 MEF in Riyadh and Briefed the COS on the capabilities of the Battery. As a result of our briefing he was determined that the Battery should be deployed to join 1 MEF. The Battery Commander - Chris McIntosh - and the Battery were delighted with this response. However, our hierarchy were not so enthusiastic. On return to UK the battery had to wait until after Christmas when COMAW, (Commodore Grindal) and the Fleet Missile & Gunnery Officer (FMGO), (Cdr Ford) persuaded the powers that be, that the Battery should be involved. The official date of our involvement was 25 Jan 91. Those who took part are shown in the orbat below: Maj H A McKenna RA RALONGS-NGLO RS M Jepson NGLO Maj A S Harvey RA EX RALONGS-NGLO/SACC Sgt S P Richardson NGLO/SACC NGFO4 (Op Trebor) NGFO6 (Snow to desert) Capt A C Rafferty RA Sgt G Pennington Bdr D J Sams Bdr SWHaylandLBdrMRCaneLROSHuckleGnrJJSmith LBdr Bressington Gnr L Milne. The four reasons for our involvement were: 1. A requirement for NGLO/SACC personnel on board American gunships. 2. A requirement for NGFO teams to support the coalition troops fighting the coastal battle. 3. NGFO teams or parts thereof would be required to support SF operations on either the islands off Kuwait or on the coast itself. 4. NGFO teams might be required in support of mine clearing operations. The period between arrival in theatre and actually carrying out the task was most frustrating, very amusing and quite an eye opener.
Frustrating because it was difficult to obtain the support which we, myself and Hugh, expected from Riyadh based RN and Log Sp Staff, obtaining authority to move the NGFO party from UK to the Gulf, obtaining training facilities for both parties and confirming tasks for the NGFO parties. The majority of the G2/G3/G4 support that was obtained was as a result of calling in favours from people who we knew from back home. Name dropping helped on a few occasions! Amusing, because I never expected to go to a war where I could flit from one country to another, stay in four if not five star hotels and obtain my latest sitreps from CNN news, fire off every round of the main armament of an American Battleship, hear of an NGFO party carrying out with SF an operation to take back a British Embassy, to be met by the press, to be blown out of my bunk as a result
of the USS Tripoli hitting a mine. An eye opener because it showed how incredibly helpful and co-operative and professional the majority of people were, no matter what nationality, the speed at which security clearance to a very high level, could be obtained, movement staff were extremely co-operative and helpful, the ease at which we were able to move around the Fleet (Sgt Steve Richardson might disagree with that statement), the ease at which we accepted the cocktail of jabs against some pretty nasty stuff that Saddam had tucked up his sleeve, SCUD missile attacks which were more accurate than people let on, that the RN really can shoot down SILKWORM missiles! (HMS Gloucester was given a special mention in the evening prayers on board USS Missouri). The NGS part of the operation was limited to the two American Battleships firing their 16” guns. I know the USS Winsconsin fired some of their rounds because it was shown on CNN news and Sgt Richardson told me as a result of his short stay on board that ship.
Prior to D Day, my tasks had been to collect a Target List from MOD (A) where US CINCENT was based in Riyadh. The collection and delivery of that target list back to USS Missouri is a long and frustrating story. Suffice it to say we, myself and Sgt Richardson ended back at the SACC on board USS Tripoli, Hugh McKenna and R S Jepson on board HMS Gloucester and with the two NGFO parties training at Camp Victor with SF. The SACC on the USS Tripoli was run by a Lt Col USMC with seven officers who had never run a SACC before. Dare I say it, but myself and Sgt Richardson sorted it out to run with three shifts with Lt Col Hemmerle USMC as a floater and our Boss. At this stage, using the local Anti-Air Warning Control and Reporting net, the TAC net, and the air MCM net controlling the MH53M helicopters, we spent the time deconflicting local air traffic, MCM helicopters, and fast jets returning and transiting to Iraq. The SACC operation, on board the USS Tripoli came to a grinding halt four days after she had been hit by a mine. She had taken on too much water with rivets popping out of 2” steel plates, it was decided she had to be escorted out of the operational area. We returned to the USS Missouri along with COMDESON 22 Flag (Commodore Bukeley) on 23 Feb 91. That evening and until 0500 hrs the following morning, the ship went to General Quarters. Myself, Sgt Richardson and USN Lt Cdr fired a number of targets, using the RPV as the spotter on Failaka Island. These targets were on CTF target lists and were updated using TARBULS. Generally speaking these were Triple A, gun and mortar positions, trench systems and a suspected SILKWORM site (later to be proven a dummy). In the early planning stages it became very obvious that there was no way spot teams could be put ashore. The coast line was awash with Iraqi troops and SF were certainly not going to visit it and we agreed!
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