Page 52 - ABA Salvoes 1999-2024

HMS M33
By JMFT
You could be forgiven for thinking that this piece concerns a motorway – but worry not – we in the ABA continue to be more interested in various aspects of NGS than motorways – although these days we no doubt routinely use motorways more than we routinely use NGS.
HMS M33 was built in 1915 by sub contractors of Harland and Wolff in Belfast. She was laid down in March, launched in May, commissioned in June and on the 6th of August saw her first action supporting the Gallipoli landings. She was part of the M29 Class of “small monitor” and was a tiny 580 ton oil fired craft, 171 feet long, 31 feet broad and drawing 6 feet with a crew of three Officers and 67 Sailors and Marines. She was armed with two 6 Inch Mk 12 guns, one forward and one aft, on open, deck level mountings. These guns fired a 100 lb projectile out to a maximum range of fourteen and a half thousand yards. Additionally there were a couple of 6 Pounders and some Lewis guns for local defence. The purpose of monitors, of whatever size, was to provide NGS in support of land forces. To this end they were shallow draught unarmoured vessels, of limited self sufficiency, Spartan standards of accommodation and worryingly poor sea keeping qualities and additionally the “small monitor” class had to be towed anywhere which involved a journey of over three days steaming as after that they ran out of fuel. In other words they were floating gun platforms whose only purpose was to be able to close with the shore and deliver effective NGS and it was accepted that they required considerable support while in their NGS role. Note here that most RN monitors were considerably larger than the “small monitor “ class, some mounting 12 and even 14 inch guns, but these craft could not get so close into the shoreline.
The M33 operated in Gallipoli waters during that unsuccessful campaign from August 1915 to January 1916; after the evacuation she was in support of Allied land operations in Macedonia until 1918. Following the Armistice and a bit of a refit in Chatham she moved to Murmansk, Archangel and subsequently the Dvina River as part of the British Forces who were supporting White Russian troops fighting the Red Russians in the Russian Revolutionary War. She returned to Chatham in 1919, lost her NGS capability and served in a variety of non operational RN roles until finally paid off in 1984.
50 | Amphibious Bombardment Association
All very interesting you might think, but so what? Well, if you visit Portsmouth Historic Dockyard you can see the now restored M33 in a little dry dock just next door to HMS VICTORY. You can get into the ship for £10 (£9 if you are old) and if you are ever in the area it is money well spent. But be careful as the pleasant and willing volunteers who will show you round are not really NGS specialists. There is only space here for a few thoughts on how ”small monitor” NGS actually worked in 1915 and it is worthwhile bearing in mind what we understand to be NGS “best practice” from WW2 and indeed the Falklands. In 1915 we were still learning. So far as is known there were no naval guns specifically designed for NGS; so the M33 was armed with standard naval guns, which are basically anti ship weapons, rather the same as tank guns are basically anti tank weapons. This means a high-ish MV and a flat-ish trajectory; not necessarily ideal for engaging land targets in hilly terrain. This was the case in 1915 as indeed it was in 1982. M33’s guns were cast offs from old battleships or cruisers where they had been part of the ship’s secondary armament. It follows that there was no specific ammunition designed for NGS, so the M33 had HE pd and shrapnel rounds. As can be seen from the amazing fast build time, the M33 was a simple, maybe even rather jerry built craft constructed of half inch steel plate and nobody seems to have considered if it was strong enough to bear the weight of the guns, nor was the hull’s ability to deal with the recoil forces when the guns fired properly assessed. This meant that after a while the deck and parts of the hull began to break up and the ship had to be withdrawn for strengthening. It became SOP that both guns were never fired together, as apart from the risk to the hull, the double recoil when firing abeam caused the ship to skid sideways away from its firing position. The best practice adopted was either to use the forward gun and position the ship bow on to the target, or to turn 180 degrees and fire over the stern with the aft gun. Technical problems notwithstanding, the main difficulty was find out what was to be fired at, and to be informed of the effectiveness of the fire – and indeed when to stop!
It seems that there were RN personnel on the various Gallipoli beaches as that was the route by which all stores and personnel arrived in theatre. It is assumed that the RN communication capability extended to the M33 or some senior directing ship – there is one comment that for some operations NGS was centrally controlled from the bridge of the battleship HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH. We assume that these RN shore parties were in some sort of contact with the command elements of our forward troops; it does not, however, seem that the RN parties actually did any observing. Note here that shore- ship communications were by flag or lamp. A more sophisticated system of fire control was by either spotter planes or observers in captive balloons. The planes were equipped with rudimentary CW radio sets and it is thought