Page 128 - The Wish Stream Year of 2022 CREST

nating in four arduous timed tests undertaken on four consecutive days, being an endurance course, 9-mile speed march, Tarzan assault course and a 30-mile cross-terrain challenge. The qualifying times for the Commando Tests are harder for the young officers than those for recruits – for instance 7 hours to complete the 30 miler rather than 8 hours for recruits. Passing the Commando Course entitle Marines, includ- ing Army Commandos, to wear the green beret. Pass Out Parade is on the Thursday of Week 60 and Young Officers (now as substantive Sec- ond Lieutenants) join their units as newly trained troop commanders on the following Monday.
Army
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
The present Academy is the amal-
gamation (in 1947) of the Royal
Military College (RMC) Sandhurst (RMC) and the Royal Military Academy (RMA) Woolwich, plus some other now defunct officer training units.
RMA Woolwich
Woolwich was founded in 1741 by The Board of Ordnance at The Warren (later called The Royal Arsenal) in Woolwich, south-east London. The Academy was initially established in a converted former workshop at The Warren (hence its nick- name thereafter ‘The Shop’ and also giving rise to the phrase ‘talking shop’ said to have entered common parlance from the Academy, commonly meaning ‘to discuss work matters when not at work). Woolwich was intended for the profes- sional training of officers destined for free com- missions in the Regiment of Artillery and Corps of Engineers, both of which had been set up by The Board of Ordnance at The Warren in 1716. Much later, officers destined for the Royal Tank Regiment (formed from the Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps as the Tank Corps in 1917), for the Royal Signals (formed in 1920 from the Royal Engineers Signal Service) and for other technical corps were trained at Woolwich until its closure in 1939 at the outbreak of World War II. During the war, Woolwich (as with Sandhurst for cavalry and infantry units) operated as an Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) for wartime commis- sions in Artillery, Engineers and Signals units.
RMA Woolwich had moved in 1806 into brand new premises on Woolwich Common designed by the renowned architect James Wyatt. Although the buildings of the former Woolwich
Academy were used for a variety of purposes by the Army for many years after its final closure in 1947, the MOD decided in 2002 that it had no further use for them and they were sold to a pri- vate developer. The ‘Tudor Gothic’ style Grade II listed building has in the past 10 years been developed into a mix of luxury private and hous- ing association accommodation.
Officer training for cavalry
and infantry officers
For much of the 200 years from 1660 to 1871, the primary way of obtaining an initial com- mission (and subsequent advancement) in the British Army for guards, cavalry and line infan- try officers was by purchase. The absence of a professionally-trained officer corps in the cavalry and infantry was the ‘accepted norm’, and not to be fully rectified until much later in 1871 with the abolition of commission purchase. For much of its existence, the system was riddled with abuse and corruption, including the purchase of com- missions for children of wealthy families and the use of unofficial private ‘commission brokers’ acting as intermediaries between buyers and sellers for large fees. However, thanks to the recognition of some more skilled and dedicated officers, such as Major (later Major General) John Gaspard Le Marchant, there became a slow and somewhat begrudging recognition of the need to move away from the ‘enthusiastic amateur’ status of officers towards better trained and more professional ones. The Flanders Campaign (1793-1795), the first real engagement against the post-revolutionary French Republic by a coalition of Anglo-Hanoverian, Dutch, Hessian, Imperial Austrian and Prussian troops, was the initial catalyst for improved British cavalry and infantry officer training.
Much has been written by military historians about the Flanders Campaign, and the lack of success by the Allies (and particularly by the British) so suffice it to say that it was Major Le Marchant’s experiences both as a regimen- tal officer with 2nd (The Queen’s) Regiment of Dragoon Guards, known as the ‘Bays’ leading a squadron into battle (particularly when he noted at first hand the superior skill and training of the Austrian cavalry), and also acting as a staff officer (Brigade Major) to General Harcourt and his cavalry brigade, that convinced him of the most urgent need, not only to greatly improve the fighting effectiveness of the British cavalry, but even more importantly for the professional
126 HISTORICAL