Page 66 - Cormorant Issue 20 2017

PAGE 64
A Uni ed Georgia? Unlikely and here’s why ...
Lt Cdr André Milne
THE FIVE-DAY CONFLICT IN 2008 between Russia and Georgia has left an unsolvable problem that will prohibit the return to a
uni ed Georgia. The origin of the con ict has received much scrutiny but in the simplest form saw the clash of two opposing policy
positions. On one side, increased western alignment of Georgia towards NATO and the EU post the 1991 break-up of the Soviet Union, and on the other, Russia’s intent to ‘take charge’ of its near-abroad thus preventing further NATO expansion. The result saw a Russian invasion into Georgia that essentially constituted a land-grab of the two break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; incidentally this invasion followed a period of Georgian posturing towards South Ossetia. The post con ict dynamic has delivered political stasis with little prospect to advance beyond the stand-off between Georgia’s western backers and Russia (... for now!). At the most basic level, the physical reality of occupied territories within the sovereign state of Georgia is certain to provide routine challenge to the current unresolved condition. For example, villages and families physically split by the revised 2008 boundaries, which themselves tend to ‘creep’ further into Georgia over time, but tactical challenges such as these are unlikely to trigger a mutually acceptable state-level resolution.
In December 2016, the Russian Foreign ministry published a formal declaration to seek better
relations with Georgia. In response, the Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvilli said, “On the one hand, this strategy expresses the desire to normalize relations with Georgia as far as possible, and we certainly share this desire. But on the other hand, this document talks about a new reality and new independent states, which will never be acceptable to the Georgian people and government.” In short there is no Georgian appetite to accept the ‘loss’
of the two territories. To do so would lose popular support.
In May this year Vladimir Putin said with sincerity, “We never interfere in the political life and the political processes of countries.” Since 2008, in Georgia alone, Russian nancial, administrative, political
and military support has enveloped the territories, culminating early this year with South Ossetia’s separatist army moving under command of the Russian military. While the territorial boundaries are not fully recognised internationally as borders, they are absolutely treated as such by Moscow and
are actively policed by ‘Abkhaz’ / ‘South Ossetian’ border guards which has led to numerous local detentions of transgressors. Add to this a signi cant build-up of Russian military facilities along the pseudo ‘borders,’ then it is not dif cult to see that the passage of time will eventually ‘reallocate’ these territories. A further normalisation weave is the ‘international complicity’ through an impartial EU boundary monitoring mission, which is prohibited from monitoring the Russian side as it ‘respects’ the physical line on the ground. Uni cation appears a long way off.
So, for Georgia the wider dynamic is the balance between the popular agenda of full integration or
“
closer alignment with NATO and the EU. The ‘so what’ sees Georgia caught internationally between the West and Russia, but signi cantly domestically caught against their own popular support for integration. Out with the international challenge, progress needs to be shown on a domestic level and this is where a diplomatic dance is being carefully choreographed. While there is unequivocal domestic support for full integration into NATO and EU, the foreseeable future sees closer alignment as the
only realistic waypoint. This happens to also offer the advantage of iterative diplomatic ‘progress.’ Among the reasons full integration is unrealistic is that Georgia will not cede territory to Russia and
a theoretical membership of NATO would in-effect inherit an Article V situation for NATO ... a non- starter for international relations between the West and Russia! Plus, there is uncertainly within NATO whether it should in itself enlarge further. Where EU membership is concerned, Georgia has a long way to go to meet threshold criteria; one example being environmental policy and pollution emission levels. Again, closer alignment is more pragmatic as demonstrated through recent European trade agreements and non-visa travel status to the Schengen zone.
Both institutional positions, which fall short of full integration, will leave Russia satis ed they have achieved an ‘interim’ objective. Relative stagnation of respective membership plans for Georgia also afford additional Russian leverage through the break-away republics and crucially maintains a destabilised near- abroad to preclude western ‘advances.’ If Georgian negotiation towards the West deepens, Russia can throttle up the territorial rhetoric such as that caught well by a Foreign Ministry statement on 22 June,
In short there
is no Georgian appetite to accept
the ‘loss’ of the two
territories.
◆◆◆