Page 13 - The Royal Lancers Chapka 2017

REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL LANCERS (QUEEN ELIZABETHS’ OWN) 11
and armoured/heavy BCT cavalry squadrons include a tank company. There is a greater emphasis on offensive activities (re- connaissance in force) vice enabling activities (reconnaissance).9 A better model for equivalency is the US Marine Corps, whose light armoured reconnaissance battalions (equipped with the LAV-25) fall under the command of the USMC’s marine divi- sions. USMC Regimental Combat teams (RCTs, similar to a UK brigade) are reinforced with light armoured reconnaissance companies (27 LAV-25s).
There seems to be a pervasive ‘time’ calculus that drives this dis- tribution.10 Accepting the crudity of real estate yardsticks11, the width and depth and of an armoured infantry brigade12 is recog- nisable as that of a single reconnaissance squadron.13 Related is the battle procedure and tactical planning horizons at different levels of command. The ability for an armoured cavalry battle- group to influence brigade activity inside a 30-6 hour planning horizon is limited, whilst the division’s traditional planning horizon (48-12 hour) allows us to inform the plan and shape it through the conduct of activity in the deep.
Exercise IRON RESOLVE
A chance encounter with a 3rd (United Kingdom) Division Fu- ture Plans SO2 during the Exercise NORTHERN LANCER vis- itors’ day and the offer of some divisional reconnaissance collab- orative planning in the build-up to Exercise IRON RESOLVE (the Division’s Command and Staff Training event), snow-balled into the Regiment providing a Divisional Recce Force (DRF) headquarters LOCON. The command-post exercise was vast: 3rd (United Kingdom) Division’s gamut of integrating cells, functional branches and various HQs; the ARRC as a ‘hicon’; and, 1, 20, 7 and 101 Logistics Brigades as fellow ‘locons’. The scenario saw a belligerent Bothnia (no prizes for seeing through
9 Anecdotally, much is made of AJAX’s relative protection and lethality vice CVR(T), and many a false conclusion drawn assumes an AJAX CONEMP of recce in force. In a Peer+ context, AJAX provides little additional lethal effect against, and negligible additional physical protection from, enemy MBTs equipped with a 125mm smooth-bore main armament and AT-11 Sniper (9K119M Refleks); in- deed, arguably less protection when defining it in terms of the ‘survivability onion’ (‘don’t be there, don’t be seen, don’t be targeted...’) and AJAX’s signature.
10 Planning and execute horizon combined with space - width and depth – that is enemy rather than ground focussed.
11 Reconnaissance real estate is a function of time available and fidelity of search (search categories); screens are rarely contiguous and instead mobility corridor or avenue of approach focussed
12 The brigade is traditionally 15 km in defence, 7 km in attack. The Staff Of- ficer’s Handbook (SOHB), 2014.
13 15 km advance, 10km in screen. The Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment ob cite.
this anonymity) having invaded the Baltic States, cuing a NATO Article 5 intervention, and the ARRC (with a Canadian, US, Danish and Italian Division under command) as the framework land component pitted against a Bothnian corps.
As the core of the DRF – a task-organised combined arms group- ing comprising an armoured cavalry regiment, dedicated ISR, STA, fires, additional logistics and a light cavalry squadron – we were able to support and enable divisional-level manoeuvre pro- viding insight and early shaping effects across a 60 km frontage (which felt comfortable following the stretches of Ex NORTH- ERN LANCER). The DRF became a significant and relied- upon stakeholder within the divisional deep battle, necessarily gearing with the intelligence and information manoeuvre com- munities as well as with fires from the Artillery Brigade. Along with space came time, with the DRF given days rather than hours to develop the situation in front of the brigades. Despite the conspicuous absence of ground mounted manned reconnais- sance from the divisional TASKORG for so long, the value of persistent and dedicated surveillance not ‘locked-out’ by enemy air defence was instantly recognised. Our ability to escort other sensors (SELLAR (Electronic Warfare) ‘baselines’ and weapon locating radars) into the deep, providing extending detection ranges, was warmly welcomed. The DRF executed classic recon- naissance and security tasks: finding avenues of approach for the Division; disrupting enemy reconnaissance; finding and cross- cuing an air/aviation strike onto the divisional artillery group (DAG); and, screening and guarding the Division’s flank from counter-attack by the corps reserve independent tank brigade.
An extensive list of lessons arose for us as we raised our collective sights to the divisional-level: the conduct of the counter-recce (counter-ISR) fight and our understanding (not just equipment recognition) of enemy corps and divisional capabilities; fight- ing for communications over eye-watering distances; liaison and collaborative working with a leviathan of a higher-headquarters; and, the sustainment challenge with greater distance and dis- persal. The DRF is on the TASKORG for 3 (United Kingdom) Division’s next trial by ordeal: Exercise WARFIGHTER 18.4 (a UK division working within a US corps) in March 2018 in Fort Bragg. The mantle has passed to the RDG and we wish them happy hunting.
Away from WARFIGHTER, 2018 promises further welcome intellectual investment in reconnaissance across the Army: a DSTL-sponsored wargame and the long-overdue re-write of Formation Reconnaissance Tactics by Warfare Branch. Howev- er, the next SDSR (or Modernising Defence Programme) looms large. An opportunity to cohere ends, ways and means will likely be sacrificed on the altar of consensus politics and myopic popu- larism: ‘over-all’ number preservation, capbadge protection and thus capability salami-slicing. The result will probably be an RAC of 14(ish) Regiments14, well in excess of our war-fighting capability in reconnaissance outputs (even with AJAX medium armour and two-step form). We have a kind of disguised unem- ployment through subsidised overmanning that is reminiscent of the National Coal Board in the 1970s. Fewer, better-manned, better equipped, better trained and sustained cavalry regiments, grouped at the divisional-level (with squadrons that can work to brigades), with resourced and tailored combat support and service support task organisation affiliations, offers the best op- portunity for a coherent outcomes-based narrative from which must flow tactical doctrine, ORBATs and contextualised train- ing. We shall see...
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14 Currently: 10 Regular and 4 Reserve, of which - under Army 2020 - two will be (CR2) heavy armour, supported by one of the reserve regiment (RWxY). Two will be (AJXAX) medium armour, the balance are ‘reconnaissance’ at least in name.