Page 45 - Last Chargers example

Remarks
A number of observations were made in The Cavalry Journal of April 1921 in an article called ’The 5th Cavalry Bde at Cérizy – 28th August 1914’ by Lieutenant Colonel RGH Howard-Vyse CMG DSO. This of cer had been the Brigade Major of the 5th Cavalry Brigade on the day of the charge150.
‘The performance of the German cavalry furnishes an excellent example of “how not to do it.” Their patrols were bold enough, indeed, but were neither intelligently directed nor skilfully led. No attempt was apparently made to locate our anks, and the presence of our small detachment on the very impor- tant spur north-west of Alaincourt was probably unsuspected. It is obviously useless, when the enemy has been located by one patrol, to despatch other reconnaissance in precisely the same direction. Yet this is what the Germans did from 11.30 am till 2.00 pm on this particular day.
To advance in close order, in full view of an enemy who is known to be in position, is only slightly less suicidal than to follow up such an error by dismount- ing in the open when red upon.
On the British side the importance is well shown of con ning detachments to a minimum, so as to keep in hand (though not necessarily concentrated in one mass) as large a main body as possible, ready to strike or to move to a threatened point. The temptation must be resisted of trying to close to the enemy all possible avenues of approach. There are always only a very limited number of routes by which an enemy could advance who would be strong enough to inter- fere with the force to be protected. It is suf cient to block these routes, the selection of which demands a careful study of the map and of the general situation.
In the present instance, the spur north-west of Alaincourt was a particularly valuable tactical point, because our possession of it enabled the dismounted attack to deploy against the enemy’s left ank. It is interesting to note that, when the Germans occupied
150 Howard-Vyse p116
this line in again 1917, since it overlooked the whole of the valley running up towards Cérizy.
The action furnishes a good pattern for the combina- tion of re and shock. We are taught that if possible the charge should be delivered in a direction different from that of the re of the guns; but on the present occasion this was not necessary, because the shape of the ground enabled the guns to re over the heads of the charging cavalry up to the last moment before the collision.
The result of lifting the re of the guns to deal with possible hostile reserves is too obvious to need further mention; and the same remark applies to the value of discipline and mounted drill, which alone will enable a squadron to manoeuvre under re as was done by the 12th Lancers.
• The whole action, judged from the moment when the German Squadrons made their appearances till the 12th Lancers had completed their charge, took considerably less time than the reader will occupy who scans this account of it. To those who scoff at the value of the arme blanche one might address four questions.
• First, do they consider time to be of importance in war?
• Secondly, how long do they suppose it would take to carry out a dismounted attack across a steep open valley three-quarters of a mile wide?
• Thirdly, do they think that such an attack would suffer less than forty casualties?
• Fourthly, given an enemy whose morale is already shaken, which kind of attack do they conceive will impress him most, three Squadrons (250 men) galloping at him, or the same number of Squadrons (180 men) walking towards him?
The affair was, of course, a walkover for the 5th Cavalry Brigade, with eight well-led Squadrons against two which played into our hand. But its results are not to be gauged merely by the destruction
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