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 Every other country has one, we don’t have one. I think you’ve got to remove the statue of limitations
in bank cases, that they can’t deliberately put off cases indefinitely so it runs out of time. I think you’ve got
to have a proper Tribunal System set-up to sort-out compensation for the people that have been defrauded. I think it should be compulsory that at least half the board of a bank should actually be qualified to be bankers. I think you got to put a stop to this unlimited personal guarantees that are outrageously abused.
People with small debts were bankrupted then had their assets stolen off them that are worth many
many times their original debt. And that is divided-
up between the cronies, in my view, the insolvency practitioners and others, and vast sums of money simply disappears. Where did all the money go from the HBOS case? I think probably at least £600 or £700 million went straight abroad. I think we only recovered about £15 million out of a vastly bigger sum at the moment. Who made the money and where is it sitting?
And again, I come back that we don’t have the capacity or the capability to investigate fraud properly. I
think there is a massive problem in our regulatory authorities. The two major ones are the Financial Conduct Authority and the Financial Reporting Counsel that’s meant to keep an eye on auditors.
I find it quite extraordinary that the chairman of the Financial Conduct Authority, until the beginning of this month, was a very senior partner of KPMG that did the audits of the HBOS bank. They overlooked
a fraud that approached a million pounds, and a multi-multi-billion pound hole, probably approaching
£40 billion, in the accounts, and the man went on to be the chairman of the Financial Conduct Authority.
The chairman of the Financial Reporting Counsel keeps an eye on the auditors gave KPMG a clean bill of health last year. His previous job was chairman of Lloyds when this was going on. So how on earth do people expect to get justice for a system like this?
Now I go from this meeting this afternoon, I’ve got a meeting with Andrew Bailey who’s the chief executive of the Financial Conduct Authority, and he’s asked me to go and see him and we’re going to have a very interesting conversation I think. I don’t know quite how we stop this, I hope now, talking at the most senior level of government, and I mean that.
In 2013 there was an internal report written
within Lloyds called the Turnbull Report. It was commissioned by Lloyds, but they now deny it was commissioned by them, but they did because I’ve got their internal emails, and that lays-out quite clearly what went on within Lloyds bank, and Lloyds say
it’s not only did we not commission it, but it’s an unsubstantiated report. But it was written three years before they’d admit to a fraud that is clearly laid out in this report. So it is pretty well substantiated.
Now Financial Conduct Authority has sat on that report for several years, for three years anyway, I’ve made absolutely certain now that is has gone to the home office, it has gone to the serious fraud office, and I hope that something will now be done about it.
I, by no means, convinced that that is going to do
it. I need to be called in front of the treasury select committee and asked the right questions, and then I’m
                 ITNJ Special Court Seating Global Financial Corrupton
& Collusion
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