Page 12 - GALIET THE BEAUTIFUL INNATE: Meno & Theatetus Plato IV

Galiet & Galiet
truths 3⁄4 that if, for example, a square exists, another one exists, whose area is twice of a given square which has as a base the diagonal of the first, it is undoubtedly a correct thesis, whose recognition gives prominence to the study of the necessary connection between hypothesis and consequence in a-priori truths.
Second, most of Socrates’ questions are poignantly leading and manipulating, not to mention that the slave would be under social pressure to please his master. The questions are formulated in such way that some of the answers are part of the questions. Thus, they induce many of the answers and indirectly teach the slave (though Socrates may never admit it!) to grasp the concept of area (82c-e) and of algorithms to obtain the area of a square10 (83e). The slave does appear, though, to genuinely know the form of a square11 (82c), how to count and multiply by two (82d), and to make reasonable deductions, though at times, he is led to contradiction. It seems evident that Socrates’ induces the slave to notice the diagonal by using, in contemporary terms, Bruner’s instructional scaffolding method, that is, feeding him the right answer in such a way that asking the right questions gives the impression of building a scaffold to access knowledge rather than to spark its innate recollection.
Consequently, the entire recollection affair is suspicious and ambiguous.12 All Plato demonstrates in the end is that what the slave knows (the Pythagorean theorem) is what Socrates knows and has told him or led him to believe. To understand the ambiguity, it might be wise to ask if it is feasible for the slave to
10 It seems evident that Socrates’ didactic process allows the slave to figure out the formula or algorithm to obtain the area of the square for he responds nine to three times three feet and eight to how many feet is a double square.
11 Of course, he could have lied being under the pressure of a master.
12 This brings us back to Meno’s question: If he knows, as Meno posits, inquiry is unnecessary; if he does not know, inquiry is impossible.
• 12 •