Page 12 - GALIET METAPOIESIS AND TRUTH IV+

Galiet & Galiet
What relationship exists, or can exist 3⁄4 what dance? 3⁄4 between Nature and ontology, being and reality, noesis and poiesis, remembering and forgetting and their sublimation into metapoiesis.
It all ends with the notion of being by nature related to, yoked to the notion of having something intrinsically of itself, in itself, for itself. But how does it begin? How does it get there? For that, we shall have to wait. For now, this last definition is not foreign to Aristotle’s influential many-sense definitions of nature or φυσις as generation of what grows (φυεσθαι); as the first element from where what grows emerges; as the principle of the first immanent movement in each of natural beings by their very nature; as the primary element of which an object is made or from where it arises; and as the primary reality of things.12 In regards to these definitions, the name nature can be given to many things or many processes: to a principle of being, to a principle of motion, to a component element, to an element of which all bodies are made of, etc. Aristotle, however, indicates that all these definitions have something in common: nature is “the essence of things which have in themselves, as such, a source of movement.”13 This is why matter can be called nature, but only insofar it is capable of receiving this principle of self- motion or of change and growth only in relation to movement proceeding from this principle. Nature is, then, “a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute”14 3⁄4 that is, an accident.
From this, it can be asserted that the nature of a thing 3⁄4 or the nature of all “natural things” 3⁄4 is what makes the thing or things to have being and, consequently, to come into being through a motion that resides within, proper to itself or themselves. Whatever exists by nature, then, opposes what exists by other causes such as art or τεχνη,15 and convention or νομος. Whatever lacks the principle of motion or growth in itself, impeding their becoming or their acting according to what its nature is in itself, does not possess the “substance” called nature. Nature is, then, at the same time, substance and cause 3⁄4 and the cause is both efficient and final.
12Aristotle.Met.,Book4,1014b16-1015a12. Aristotle.TheBasicWorksofAristotle.Metaphysics.Ed.RichardMcKeon. New York: The Modern Library, 2001.
13 Aristotle. Met., Book 5, Ch. 4, 1015a 13. Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Metaphysics. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: The Modern Library, 2001.
14 Aristotle. Phys., II, 1, 192b 20. Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Physics. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: The Modern Library, 2001.
15 Aristotle. Phys., II, 192b, 18. Aristotle. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Physics. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: The Modern Library, 2001.
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