Page 29 - GALIET METAPOIESIS AND TRUTH IV+

Galiet & Galiet
However, how and when this matriarchal-patriarchal transition from Lethe to aletheia takes place? Why does Heidegger transpose aletheia back to that oniric and mysterious realm of nature, of Demeter-Dionysus far-off from Minerva’s owl? If indeed it were to belong, to dwell there, what would then occur to Lethe? Where would it sojourn, if sojourn at all, to nomos’ realm? Just as Heidegger links aletheia and phusis, is it possible to link, without ridicule, Lethe and nomos, Lethe and Zeus-Apollo, and Lethe to the Idea, the absolute and suprasensible? Supposing it were so, what mode of relationship, osmosis would or could exist, then, between Lethe and the absolute, Lethe and essence, Lethe and substance, Lethe and nous? Is it correct for Heidegger to deny, to negate Bachofen’s relationship between Lethe and becoming, Lethe and existence, Lethe and accidents? True 3⁄4 in Bachoven, Aletheia, associated with νομος and with the Idea affirms that Aletheia “came under the yoke of the idea,”102 as Heidegger contends. Does this suggest Bachofen’s research lacked this insight? Or that Heidegger’s profound contemplation misunderstood it? If aletheia indeed primordially belongs to the realm, not of nomos, but of φυσις 3⁄4 of Knossos and Eleusis, not of Olympus and the Acropolis 3⁄4 then what follows as consequence, as conclusion, by analogy, is that aletheia, in being transposed to Bachofen’s pre-Indo European matriarchy is always in a state of becoming and not of being, of existence and not of essence, of accidents and not of substance, of immanence and not of transcendence, of poiesis and not of noesis, of mythos and not of logos. In short, it does away with Plato’s notion of truth, with everything Plato opposed and refuted. In this new paradigm, poiesis 3⁄4 as making, creating, fabricating 3⁄4 is sublimated, resuscitated from its profane, penurious cavernesque depths taking the place of Plato’s noesis as its new, permanent abode. Abode whose power animates and infuses poeisis with phusis: the radiant aura of being in becoming.
Why then believe in Plato’s noesis at all? Or in Heidegger’s poiesis? Why then believe in aletheia as phusis based on fragile fragments, etymologies of archaic languages? Why accept the equivocal analogy between the nature of a rose and that of complex human being? After all, a human is not a rose, but a thinking-feeling-willing being. After all, there are other conceptions of Aletheia in antiquity. For the Hebrew, Emunah, truth, suggests security and trust. The truth of things is not reality in relation to appearance, but of fidelity in relation to infidelity; fidelity in the sense of those who are faithful and deliver promises according to convention, not nature. God is the only truth because he is the only being that is truly faithful and that can keep his promise. While a Greek says that ‘something that is has a being that is,’ a Hebrew says, ‘amen,’ or so be it. But Heidegger, also the obscure, is haunting. His obscurity, perhaps prophetic,
102 Heidegger. Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. Trans. J. Barlow. In Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, vol. 3. Ed. W. Barrett and H.D. Aiken. New York: Random House, 1962. Based on 1931-1932 Lectures. 228
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