Page 35 - GALIET METAPOIESIS AND TRUTH IV+

Galiet & Galiet
however, forgets not just impressions, perceptions, but also necessity, the Fates’ destinies of mortals. In this twice forgetting, of existence, accidents and of being, only a tabula rasa perdures and comes into being. As such, Lethe is not an aspect of phusis’ concealment or of a-Lethe’s unconcealment and concealment in its own appearing. To conceal is to purposely hide, and what is purposely hidden, belongs to nomos, not phusis. Concealing admits a sense of becoming, of being that must be denied, an existence, a permanence that must not be seen. In it, the will intervenes.
What, then, does a-letheia remember naturally, unwillingly, unconventionally? Is it a remembering, perhaps, of a certain possibility that might inadvertently defend, elucidate perhaps on Plato’s theory of anamnesis?129 A-letheia, not as Heidegger’s appearing that conceals, but as recollection of being before drinking the un-lyric waters of oblivion. Lethe, that which forgets; a-lethe, that which remembers. What? Lethe, that which forgets memory’s sensory images, shadows, appearances, impressions, conventions, once upon cast in an obscure, delapidated cavern’s wall; a-lethe, that which remembers the splendour of being, not of phusis’ innefability, tensions, differences, but that which is beyond phusis, beyond its own immaculate nature, beyond mimetic poeisis, that which is something more, a meta-poem 3⁄4 where? In the liminal space between immanence and transcendence, between this world and the other, as if a thrice union, a cosmotheandric union in phusis’ presence, we remember as a knowing, deep, unchanging, that all things in their becoming and being, in their making and being made, possess a natural beauty, whether as metaphors or as truth-as-correspondence. The made, poiesis, belonging to the poet, belongs to all, remembering ever and ever 3⁄4 forgetting never and never 3⁄4 its source, part divine, part magic, part waterfall, part river: meta-poet and poetess,
129 In the Phaedo’s second argument (72e-77c), Plato is concerned with reminiscence. It consists in affirming that given that we possess certain knowledge that cannot solely come from sensible perception 3⁄4 such as the knowledge of the equality of two things, which cannot be abstracted from experience (and in general the knowledge of the Forms), because there are never two sensible things that are alike 3⁄4 it is necessary to recognize that such knowledge proceeds from the reminiscence that the soul has of a former life in which it was not imprisoned in the body. That is, one can only recollect what one knew and learned before. However, if the soul has this constitution, the soul is a pure form, that is, an immortal entity. In logical, formal terms, Plato’s Theory of Recollection or Reminiscence can be generally expressed as follows:
1. If two necessary conditions exist:
a. IfobjectQisrecollectedatt,thenQisknownbeforet.(73c) b. WherePissimilaroranimage,pictureofQ:
i. Then, if Q is recollected from P
ii. One must know whether or not P falls short of Q (74a)
2. If one sufficient condition exists:
a. WhenoneperceivesobjectPandthinksofanotherobjectQ b. One recollects Q (73c-d) so long as:
i. P is relevantly connected to Q (73d)
ii. Perception of P causes one to think of Q (74a)
Plato. Complete Works. Phaedo. Ed. John M. Cooper. Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1997. •35•