Page 8 - GALIET FREEDOM: Kant and Rousseau IV

It is no small claim that Freedom for Kant means enlightenment, that is, in his own words, “man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity” (Kant: 54).1 For Kant, immaturity is muteness: a dark abyss where passive man, bound in chains, is oppressed by his incapacity and inability to think for himself. This dark age, the very antithesis of the enlightenment’s ideal of “Sapere Aude” or “Dare to Know” (Kant: 54), must not only be challenged, in Kant’s view, but it must be eclipsed with a new incandescence and effervescence: autonomous freedom of thought and speech.
Thus, we witness that what form of enlightenment (the age of reason, science and progress) began with Bacon, it is now reexamined by Kant and, paradoxically, it is questioned and repudiated by Rousseau. I say “paradoxically” because Rousseau, although opposed to the enlightenment ideals of “reason” versus “passion,” does exercise his courage to use and divulge his own understanding, freely, without the guidance, influence or fear of others by publishing such influential works including “A Discourse on Inequality.”2 Rousseau, therefore, by embracing Kant’s enlightenment’s ideal of “Sapere Aude,”
1 Kant, Immanuel. “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” In Kant’s Political Writings. Edited by H. Reiss. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 1970.
2 Rousseau, Jean Jacques. A Discourse on Inequality. London, UK: The Penguin Group. 1984.
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