Page 120 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Truth and Meaning
at all relevant for the study of languages, and of language as such (see Sect. 3, below).
Still, most linguists are willing to accept a division of the phenomenon of language. On the one hand, it is seen as a kind of stable, over-individual structure, or type-schema, which for the sake of simplicity may be called a 'signification system/ On the other hand, it can be viewed as a set of tokens somehow belonging to such a schema, these may be called 'utterances.' This opposition between a system of signification and its associated utterances has many names, e.g., langue-parole (Saussure), schema-usage (Hjelmslev), code-behavior (Halliday), competence-performance (Chomsky), to name just a few of the most influential. The status of communication varies depending on, first, which opposition one considers most relevant, and second, which element in the opposition one
chooses as most fundamental for the study of language.
The latter alternative allows us to distinguish between what the Soviet philosopher of language V. N. Voloshinov called 'abstract objectivists' on the one hand, and on the other, a heterogeneous group (con- sisting of behaviorists, empiricists, nominalists, 'socio'-linguists, processualists, etc.) called 'skep- ticists.' These groups will be dealt with in the follow- ing.
2.1 The AbstractObjectivist View
The abstract objectivist view can, in the light of the history of modern linguistics, be considered the tra- ditional way of seeing things. The prototypical abstract objectivist sees language as a relatively stable, finite, and invariant system of signification, that is either as a unifunctional, adult-type system which is the goal of socialization, or as a social institution (Saussure's 'langue'), or as a universal innate mental grammar (Chomsky's 'competence'), or even as a pure form (Hjelmslev's 'schema'). The relation between sig- nification system and utterances is seen as an either-or opposition: either one studies languagesystematically (i.e., as a signification system), or one doesn't study it at all. In this view, language is then something which precedes communication.
It does this in two different ways: First, as a generic term for language utterances, and therefore as a syn- onym of performance, behavior, usage, and parole. Second, communication can be viewed as the context where language is used between communicators utter- ing tokens belonging to the signification schema, i.e., the language system.
In both these views, language is seen as a pre- condition to communication, either as a structuring grammar of utterance tokens, or as a common code of some sort, defining the difference between what has meaning and what is meaningless. The code is necessary for communicators transferring a message, as in the conduit model (see above, Sect. 1.1),
accomplishing a dialogue, as in the circular model (see Sect. 1.2), interacting with one another, as in the feedback model (see Sect. 1.3), or reaching a state of autopoesis, as in the self-regulatory model (see Sect. 1.4).
2.2 The Skepticist View
Common to the skepticist view is the radical critique of the abstract objectivist opposition between the sys- tem of signification and the utterances derived from the system.
The skepticists challenge this opposition in three different and not necessarily compatible ways. In all three, communication plays a more important role in research and reflection on language than in the abstract objectivist tradition.
2.2.1 Language as Communicative Behavior
The skepticists' first option is to get rid of the oppo- sition altogether. Language as a signification system is viewed as a mentalistic abstraction from a het- erogeneous mass of data. This mentalistic abstraction is considered a type-schema product created by the analyst. Language is, then, a generic term for com- municative behavior. This view is typical of the nom- inalist and the radical descriptivist. A prominent group of philosophers of language embracing these ideas are the so-called 'analytic philosophers' in the Anglo-American tradition (e.g., the later Wittgen- stein, Strawson, Grice, Quine, Goodman). Meaning of linguistic messages in communication can only be said to belong to a signification system as an arbitrary classification of intentional(or habitual) acts having some sort of common similarity, the so-called 'family concepts'. An abstract objectivist theory of meaning, such as the (Saussurean) structuralist theory of sem- antic components and fields is in principle impossible, since in any case, message meaning is determined by an infinite number of components in a steadily chan- ging communication situation, where intention, con- textual setting, contextual restriction and other situational components play a major role.
2.2.2 Communication as Determining Language
The second option turns the abstract objectivist view upside down. It claims that communication (as a set of messages, not utterances) precedes, and is a pre- condition of, the signification system, not the other way round. Communication is viewed as determining language. Language is a message structure (Rom- metveit) embedded in time, which at the same time structures, constructs, and creates meaning as the result of an ongoing dialogic process. This view of language is closely related to the circular com- munication model (see above, Sect. 1.2), but it can also be seen as related to the non-intentional search for a common code which makes communication work in
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