Page 141 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

for assigning sentences of the interpreter's language to those of the subject language will do, it seems, as a means of generating linguistic interpretations to be tested as part of the overall psychology. One might ask more of the truth theory—that it be 'internalized' by the subject language speakers, for instance. This, however, is a problematic notion; Gareth Evans attempted to make sense of it in terms of correspon- dence between dependencies of understanding— what sentences would one lose understanding of if one forgot the meaning of s etc.—and deriv- ability relations in different candidate truth theories. But the danger for the holist is that such an approach might presuppose molecularism. The fate of holism,
then, is likely to hinge on how well it can be integrated with successful programs in cognitive psychology.
Bibliography
Davidson D 1980 Mental events. In: Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Davidson D 1984 Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Dummett M A E 1976 What is a theory of meaning? (II) In: Evans G, McDowell J (eds.) Truth and Meaning. Clar- endon Press, Oxford
Evans G 1985 Semantic theory and tacit knowledge. In: Collected Papers. ClarendonPress, Oxford
Fodor J, Lepore E 1992 Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Black- well, Oxford
The indeterminacy of translation was defended by W. V. O. Quine in his Word and Object (1960). Sup- pose one is translating another language into English. Quine holds that alternative translations could be con- structed differing in their translations of individual sentences but all fitting the speech dispositions of native speakers of the language. There is no fact of the matter which is correct; indeed, all are. One may be more useful than another, perhaps allowing one to interpret the aliens as agreeing with one's own view of the world. But this does not mean that the preferred translation manual is true or correct.
1. Quine's Argument
According to Quine:
Two translators might develop independent manuals of translation, both of them compatible with all speech behavior, and yet one manual would offer translations that the other translator would reject. My position was that either manual could be useful, but as to which was right and which wrong there was no fact of the matter.
(1979: 167)
If correct, the thesis undermines the objectivity of talk of meaning and synonymy.
Quine's argument for his thesis focuses on the nat- ure of 'radical' translation: the attempt to understand a wholly alien language unaided by knowledge of related tongues and without the help of bilinguals, etc. This makes the evidential basis for translation as clear as possible. Both in learning language and in trans- lation, he urges, 'we depend strictly on overt behavior
in observable situations' (Quine 1990: 38). Since he is concerned with 'cognitive' meaning, his view of which 'speech dispositions' are relevant is quite restricted: we attend to the circumstances in which speakers assent to different sentences.
'Observation sentences' are reliably correlated with distinctive sorts of sensory stimuli: these provide a bridgehead for translation; one seeks to translate them by sentences assented to in the same sensory conditions. But other occasion sentences, whose appli- cation depends upon supplementary information about the context, and all standing sentences cannot be correlated with sensory stimuli. Once a speaker accepts a standing sentence, his disposition to assent to it is not correlated to distinctive current sensory stimulation. The indeterminacy of translation then rests on the possibility that translation manuals may offer contrasting translations of standing sentences and some occasion sentences while agreeing in their predictions about the empirical circumstances in which observation sentences will be accepted. Quine defends a form of holism: one makes experiential pre- dictions on the basis of one's beliefs only with the aid of a mass of background theory and assumptions, so there are no precise entailments between particular standing sentences and observation sentences. This introduces a 'looseness of fit' between 'theory' and observation which makes room for indeterminacy.
A form of indeterminacy is defended even for obser- vation sentences: the indeterminacy of reference. Sup- pose that an alien sentence is uttered only in the
Indeterminacy of Translation C. J. Hookway
Indeterminacy of Translation
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