Page 151 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

others, namely, tools (PI: § 11) and money (PI: § 120). The analogy between language and tools captures the idea of seriousness, variety, and engagement with everyday practical life, but it loses the social and con- ventional element in language; the analogy with money captures the idea of serious engagement with practical life and conventionality, but loses the aspect of variety.
3. Language Games and Philosophical Method
An understanding of language games is vital for understanding Wittgenstein's later conception of phil- osophy and philosophical method. Language games are 'the primary thing' (PI: §656): it is only in the context of such games that language has meaning, significance, and point. Philosophical problems arise because philosophers have a false picture of how cer- tain complex words (e.g., knowledge, being, object (PI: § 116)) function. This invariably arises either because the use of a word in one language game is confused with its use in another (e.g., the use of measurement in the language game of temporal measurement is confused with its use in the language game of spatial measurement (Bl.B: 26-7)), or because a term is con- sidered 'outside language-games,' in abstraction from the context in which it has its life or meaning (PI: § 47). In the latter case Wittgenstein says that language is 'idling ' (PI: § 132), and has gone 'on holiday' (PI: § 38). This leads to perplexity, muddle, and confusion, and, in extreme cases, to the erection of grandiose and often paradoxical metaphysical theories which seem profound, but which are really no more than the mag- nified products of linguistic error.
Traditional philosophy, on Wittgenstein's concep- tion, is an 'illness' (PI: § 255) which can only be cured by the quiet weighingof linguisticfacts. He regarded his central task as one of bringing 'words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' (PI: §116). His method consists in 'assembling reminders' (PI: § 127)as to how words are actually used. This involves describing and noting the language games in which they have a role. Although new language games can develop and old ones disappear, they are not the kinds
of things which can ultimately be explained or justi- fied. If asked to justify the use of a certain word in a certain context, the only reply may be: This language- game is played' (PI: § 654). Philosophy no longer puts forward theses, or attempts to explain: it clears up linguistic confusions (PI: §128).
For example, there is the traditional problem of other minds: I can know that / think, have pains, feel emotions but I can never know if this is true of others; the most I can know in these cases is that they exhibit (for example)pain-behavior. It is quite possible, there- fore, that I always have been and always will be sur- rounded by automata. Wittgenstein thinks this chilling, metaphysical vision arises through mis- understanding, having a false picture of the language game we play with 'know' and 'believe' when used in conjunction with psychological words:
I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking.
It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking,' and wrong to say 'I know what I am thinking.'
(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)
(PI: §222)
See also: Family Resemblance; Private Language; Wittgenstein, Ludwig.
Bibliography
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Literary structuralism and semiotics has been and is a complex and constantly changing phenomenon. Its various forms and practices in the twentieth century
constitute the most explicit poetics that Western liter- ary, linguistic, and critical theories have been able to offer. It is however difficult to provide a neat devel-
Literary Structuralism and Semiotics T. Threadgold
Literary Structuralism and Semiotics
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