Page 173 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

the powers of logical analysis. By applying the method of meaning postulates one is able to regiment lexical meanings to a much greater extent in terms of logical analysis and modeltheoretic interpretation.
A model is constructed from basic sets using stan- dard constructions such as powerset formation. In the interpretation of a language L the basic elements of L are assigned an extension for each possible world and each moment of time. In some cases, in particular for logicalelements,thisinterpretationisveryspecific and easily definable for all possible worlds and moments of time. For example, the negation sign of logic is interpreted as a function from truth-values to truth- values assigning true to false and false to true. In other cases, however, the interpretation remains less specific. If L contains the English predicate 'walk,' for example, the predicate will be assigned a set of individuals for each possible world and each moment of time, but the interpretation is unable to specify the individuals that may be said to walk in each case. The reason for this difference is, in Carnap's words (1947: 222), that 'the truth of some statements is logical, necessary, based upon meaning, while that of other statements is empirical, contingent, dependent upon the facts of the world.' By introducing meaning pos- tulates one is able to make certain contingent truths dependent on others, thus restricting the total number of possible interpretations for the language L as a whole.
Meaning postulates are statements (postulates) for- mulated in the object language L, the language under interpretation. These statements must beanalytically true, i.e., true in virtue of meaning, in all models considered. One may, if one wishes, subdivide mean- ing postulates into a number of distinct classes. For
example, predicates denoting binary relations may be said to be reflexive, symmetrical, transitive, irreflexive, etc., as the case may be (Carnap 1947: 226-28). The predicate W(warmer than), for example, may be said to be transitive and irreflexive (and hence asym- metrical) by stipulating that:
if' W(a., /?)' and ' W($, y),' then ' W(a, y)' (la) (where a, ft, and y are names for individuals)
Or one can define one predicate's meaning in terms of the meanings of other predicates, as in:
if 'seek(a, /?)' then 'try(a, find(a, /?)),' and vice versa (2)
Or entailment relations, such as equivalence, can be expressed for combinations of individual predicates:
if 'necessarily(always (0))' then 'always(necessarily($)),' and vice versa (where <j>is a sentence) (3)
Likewise, entailment relations with respect to one or more terms can be expressed, as in:
if 'cause(a, (f>)' then '<£' (4)
If one wishes to be strict, one may consider the possi- bility of formulating a meaning postulate as a criterion of formal adequacy for dictionary definitions.
See also: Analyticity; Montague Grammar; Possible Worlds.
Bibliography
Carnap R 1947 Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, 2nd edn. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
Gamut L T F 1991 Logic, Language and Meaning. Vol. II: Intensional Logic and Logical Grammar. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
Metaphor, a trope in which one thing is spoken of as if it were some other thing, is a ubiquitous feature of natural language. While the ability to understand metaphors and use them is characteristic of mature linguistic competence, the ability to use metaphors well was considered by Aristotle a 'mark of genius' and remains today a feature of intelligence tests and assessments of creativity. In literature, in professional discourses (e.g., theology, philosophy, and law), in scientificlanguage,andindailydiscourse, metaphors provide expression for experiences and concepts for
which literal language seems insufficient, thereby increasing the range of articulation possible within the language.
What is called a 'metaphor' spans the fresh and startling use of language (illustrated by Melville's metaphor '[He] slept off the fumes of vanity'), the frequently used and barely noticed conventional meta- phors, (exemplified in using terms of light to refer to knowledge e.g., 'I see'), and the entirely familiar, even 'deadmetaphor'(employed,forinstance,bytheaqua- tic term 'current' used to speak of electricity). Whether
Metaphor
E. Steinhart and E. F. Kittay
Metaphor
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