Page 192 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Truth and Meaning
states, and in how these states relate to the meanings of sentences of their language. But whether this requires the dominant role for 'charity' urged by Dav- idson, or exactly what this conies to, has been contested. More radically, the methodology behind the radical interpretation approach to meaning and the mind may be questioned. It assumes that an account of what mental states and meanings are is to be extracted from an account of how one goes about ascribing them to others; but the true relation of pri- ority may be the reverse: it is not until there is a philosophical account of the nature of the mind, that it will be possible to determine how, if at all, one can come to know the mental states of others.
See also: Indeterminacy of Translation.
Bibliography
Blackburn S 1984 Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Davidson D 1984 Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Evans G 1975 Identity and predication. Journal of Philosophy 72:343-63
Goldman A 1989 Interpretation psychologized. Mind and Language 4:161-85
LePore E (ed.) 1986 Truth and Interpretation Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell, Oxford
Lewis D 1974 Radical interpretation. Synthese 27:331-44 McGinn C 1977 Charity, interpretation and belief. Journal
of Philosophy 74:521-35
Quine W V O 1960 Word and Object. MIT Press, Cambridge,
The idea that linguistic practice is essentially rule- governed has found widespread acceptance, especially among those engaged in constructive work in gram- mar or semantics, and has been regarded by some as almost self-evident. Nonetheless it is highly con- troversial within the philosophy of language. Pro- ponents have suggested a great number of kinds of linguistic rule, and serious attempts at demarcating and explicating the concept of a rule have been made, whereas opponents have concentrated on more gen- eral epistemological issues particularly regarding what it is to know a language and the place that rules might have in such knowledge. (For further discussion, see Convention.)
1. The Concept of a Rule
1.1 General Characterization
The term 'rule' belongs to a group of terms, including 'norm,' 'convention,' 'standard,' 'regulation,' 'direc- tive,' 'instruction,' 'law' (in the prescriptive sense), many of which frequently occur together in dictionary explanations, sometimes presented as synonyms. Ordinary linguistic usage does not provide clear-cut distinctions and no taxonomic consensus has been established among theorists.
Nevertheless, there are differences between the use of the term 'rule' and uses of its cognates which to some degree explain why it is often preferred in the- ories of language.
(a) 'Rule' is less tied to the notion of an authority, 170
for example with power to issue rules, than
'law' and 'regulation.'
(b) 'Rule' is more closely tied to the notion of guid-
ing persons in action than are 'norm' and 'stan-
dard.'
(c) 'Rule' is more closely tied to the notion of eva-
luating actions as right or wrong than, for
example, 'convention' and 'direction.'
(d) 'Rule' is more closely tied (than, for example, 'norm' and 'standard') to direct evaluation of action as opposed to indirect evaluation, in which someone is judged responsible for defects in a product. There is, however, a traditional distinction between on the one hand so-called rules of action, or ought-to-do rules (Tunsollen) and on the other hand so-called ideal rules, or ought-to-be rules (Seinsollen), such as stan-
dards for chemicals.
(e) 'Rule' has a stronger suggestion of arbitrariness
than, for instance, 'norm.' It often refers to items that can be introduced, adopted, and replaced by decision, whereas 'norm' is typi- cally used for standards perceived as not being subject to choice. Connected with this is the tendency, again marking a difference, to use 'norm' so that being in force, in a community, say, is built into the concept of being a norm.
(f) 'Rule,' more than related terms, is used with respect to special procedures (rules of inference) and institutionally created activities, such as games. The modern tradition distinguishes
MA
Rules P. Pagin