Page 35 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

anything is similar to and different from anything else in infinitely many ways, so that it is necessary to distinguish important or salient dimensions of simi- larity from others, and this once more indicates the operation of innate cognitive constraints in human thought and experience.
Fourth, there is the problem of classification: Locke supposes that when a newly encountered particular is classified, it is done so by 'matching' it with an abstract general idea—but abstract ideas are themselves (men- tal) particulars, by Locke's own principles, so the question arises as to how a particular idea is classified as being, for example, an abstract general idea of a man. A vicious regress is clearly threatened. A possible answer is to say that the original process of classifying by matching does not require an active search through the stock of mental patterns or templates as one might search through a wallpaper pattern-book, and hence does not demand an ability to classify one's own ideas: rather, the process can be thought of as more or less automatic, perhaps by analogy with the way in which a confectionery machine dispenses a bar of chocolate upon receiving a coin of the right denomination.
3. Renewed Interest in Abstract Ideas
The intuitive appeal of Locke's doctrine, and the fact
that none of the objections standardly raised against it is conclusive, help to explain its staying power, especially outside the realms of professional phil- osophy. Indeed, in the late twentieth century views recognizably akin to it (though often shorn of Locke's extreme nominalist and empiricist assumptions) have again become popular with many psychologists and philosophers interested in the mental aspects of language use, though now under the guise of talk about 'prototypes' (Eleanor Rosch) or 'stereotypes' (Hilary Putnam). An important difference, how- ever, is that stereotypes are not, unlike Lockean abstract ideas, thought of as rigidly determining the extensions of the general terms with which they are associated.
See also: Natural Kinds; Sortal Terms.
Bibliography
Locke J 1975 [1690] An Essay Concerning Human Under- standing, Nidditch P H (ed.). Clarendon Press, Oxford Lowe E J 1995 Locke on Human Understanding. Routledge,
London
Putnam H 1975 The meaning of 'meaning.' In: Putnam H
Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Within philosophy, the locus classicus for discussion of 'category-mistakes' is Gilbert Kyle's influential work The Concept of Mind (1949: ch. 1) where he argues that the traditional dualist (Cartesian) view of the mind as a separate substance, or 'ghost in the machine,' falsely 'represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category... when they actually belong to another' (Ryle 1949:16). In at least his early writings in philosophy Ryle believed that philosophical problems themselves were characteristically 'category-problems' and that philo- sophical mistakes were more often than not grounded in confusions about logical categories.
1. Identifying Category-mistakes
Category-mistakes arise, according to Ryle, not only in philosophy but in quite ordinary contexts of think- ing or speaking. He gives the example of a foreigner
being shown round Oxford or Cambridge who,having seen the colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices, then asks where the university is, 'as if "the university" stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members,' rather than being a term which describes 'the way in which all that he has already seen is organized.' Category-mistakes of this kind occur when speakers misunderstand concepts (in this case, the concept 'university').
But they can also arise where no such conceptual ignorance exists. Ryle illustrates this with the example of a student of politics who is aware of the differences between the British and, say, the American con- stitutions (the former not being embodied in any single document) but who becomes confused when trying to discuss the relations between the Church of England, the Home Office, and the British Constitution.
Category-mistake P. V. Lamarque
Category-mistake
13