Page 381 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

A presupposition is a property of a sentence, making that sentence fit for use in certain contexts and unfit for use in other contexts. Most natural language sen- tences carry one or more presuppositions. If a sentence B carries a presupposition A (B»A), then A must be true for B to be true, or more precisely, the proposition expressed by A must be true for the proposition expre- ssed by B to be true. (From here on, when necessary, a reference to a sentence is to be taken as a reference to the proposition expressed by it in every context of use.) Thus, A is an entailment of B (BNA). Since entailments are the business of logic, this implies that presupposition is in any case relevant in the logical analysis of natural language. Presuppositional entail- ments distinguish themselves, however, from other, 'classical,' entailments in that in an orderly pres- entation, transfer, and storage of information, that is, in a coherent discourse, they are, in some sense, prior to their carrier sentences. They restrict the domain within which their carrier sentence is interpretable. This, in turn, implies that presupposition is relevant in the analysis of the cognitive processes involved in the linguistic transfer of information. Such properties are commonly called 'discourse-related properties' of language.
The following examples illustrate the difference between classical and presuppositional entailments. In (la, b), the first sentence classically entails (Nc) the second; in (2a-d) the first sentence presupposes ( » ) the second:
The king has been assassinated Nc The king is (la) dead.
Nob works hard Nc Nob works. (Ib)
The distinction between classical and pre- suppositional entailments gives rise to the question of whether the distinction is purely logical, or partly logical and partly to do with the orderly transfer of information—i.e., discourse-related, or entirely dis- course-related, and hence irrelevant to logic. Answers to this question will be heavily theory-dependent and bound up with the question of how the disciplines concerned—mainly logic, semantics, and prag- matics—are to divide the labor. A decision willinvolve a whole theoretical paradigm, and only a wide variety of data, analyses, and other kinds of considerations will be able to tip the balance.
For some, discourse-related properties are prag- matic. The tendency here is to equate the logic and the semantics of language, the logic being classical and thus bivalent. Anything falling outside classical logic is taken to be pragmatic, including all discourse- bound aspects. In this view, presupposition is non- logical and purely pragmatic, and the entire burden of explanation is thus placed on a pragmatic theory still largely to be developed.
Others take presupposition to be a semantic prop- erty. They make a primary distinction between what is part of the linguistic system, that is, at 'type'-level, and what results from the interaction of the linguistic system with any contingent state of affairs in the actual or any imagined world, that is, at 'token'-level. In this view, all systematic linguistic aspects of the machinery, whereby speakers' cognitive contents (mental prop- ositions) representing possible states of affairs are sig- nified by uttered sentences and hence transferred to listeners, are considered to be semantic, whereas aspects to do with conditions of use are called prag- matic. Typically, in this view, semantics is taken to comprise a great deal more than what is provided by logic, and the logic to be adopted may well, if it incorporates the notion of presupposition, turn out to deviate from classical bivalent logic. In this semantic view, presupposition is at least partly, and for some entirely, a logical phenomenon. The terminological difference thus reflects different attitudes regarding the status of logic vis-a-vis semantics and the autonomy of the linguistic system, that is, the grammar and the semantics, of a natural language.
Finally, there is a diminishing school that looks upon presupposition as a purely logical phenomenon, requiring a nonclassical logic.
1. Operational Criteria
Whichever position one takes, it is clear that pre- suppositions are systematic properties of sentences,
Nob lives in Manchester » There exists someone called 'Nob.'
(2a)
SuehasforgottenthatNobwasherstudent » (2b) Nob was Sue's student.
Nob has come back » Nob went away. (2c)
Nob still lives in Manchester » Nob lived in (2d) Manchester before.
In (2a) one finds an example of so-called 'existential presuppositions.' These were the main starting point for presupposition theory in philosophy. Number (2b) exemplifies 'factive presuppositions' (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971); the truth of the that-clause is pre- supposed. In (2c) we have a case of 'categorial pre- supposition'; these are directly derived from the lexical meaning of the main predicate (come back). And (2d) belongs to a 'remainder category'; the presupposition being due to the adverb still.
Presupposition P. A. M. Seuren
Presupposition
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