Page 416 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Pragmatics and Speech Act Theory
with its related maxims, Grice was interested in explaining one particular set of regularities—those governing the generation and interpretation of 'con- versational implicature.' For example, my brother comes in carrying an ice cream and says: / didn't bother buying one for you, to which I reply: That's uncommonly generous of you! On the face of it, my reply is untrue. However, the CPwould lead him to assume that, in spite of appearances, I was making an appropriate comment on his behavior. He would therefore conclude that I had sacrificed a con- versational maxim at one level, in order to uphold it at another. In other words, I had said something false, butimpliedsomethingthatwastrue.Gricearguesthat without the assumption that the speaker is operating according to the CP, there is no mechanismto prompt someone to seek another level of interpretation.
of what is said. According to this view, the example given in the introductory section (That's uncommonly generous of you \) would be seen as an instance of uncooperative behavior. Now, Grice states unequivo- cally that the ostentatious nonobservance of a maxim at the level of what is said (that is, what he originally defined as a 'flout') in no way contravenes the CP.On the contrary, it is the mechanism which is required in order to generate an implicature.
The first view which is worthy of serious con- sideration (if only because it is so widely held) could be called 'real-world goal-sharing.' According to this interpretation, Grice is arguing that, in a 'normal' conversation, S and H actually have some shared interests which, by means of conversation, they 'joint- ly conspire to promote.' 'Real-world goal-sharing' refers to situations in which S shares with H some common aim or purpose beyond that of getting H to understand which proposition is being expressed or implied. According to this definition, compliance with the CP is possible only against a background of shared goals or interests, which might include (minimally) such local goals as 'keeping the conversation going,' but would generally involve a greater degree of 'real cooperation,' such as a shared interest in establishing the truth. Kiefer interprets Grice in thisway:
Now the Gricean maxims attempt to describe cooperative communication in which the participants strive after the same goal and are equally interested in achieving this goal, furthermore in which the participants have the same social status and finally in which the only goal of the communication is the transmission of information (in a maximally economical way).
(1979a: 60)
According to a third school of thought, which could be called 'linguistic goal-sharing,' Grice intended the cooperative principle to have a much more limited scope. It applies only to the observance of linguistic conventions and presupposes no shared aim or pur- pose beyond that of establishing correctly S's illo- cutionary intent (that is, getting H to understand which proposition is being expressed or implied). In particular, it does not presuppose that the proposition which is expressed, entailed, or implied is necessarily polite, relevant to any of H's real-world (extra- linguistic) social goals, or even presuppose (according to some interpretations) that it is truthful. This is the interpretation for which Holdcroft (1979) argues in his excellent discussion paper.
2. The Real-world Goal-sharing View of Cooperation
Apostel (1980), Bollobas (1981), Corliss (1981), Kasher (1976; 1977a), Kiefer (1979a), Pratt (1977; 1981), and Sampson (1982) are among the writers who understand Grice to be using the term 'cooperation' in what is called here the 'real-world goal-sharing' sense: that is, they believe that when Grice speaks
1. Different Interpretations of the Notion of versational Cooperation
Con-
Many critics of Grice's work on conversational implicature (Grice 1975; 1978; 1981) have been argu- ing at cross-purposes, and one important reason for this is that the very term 'cooperation' is misleading, since what in everyday terms would be seen as 'highly uncooperative' behavior, such as arguing, lying, hur- ling abuse, may yet be perfectly cooperative according to some interpretations of Grice's (1975) term.
Grice's own definition of the cooperative principle is ambiguous and inconsistent, and this has enabled both those who have adversely criticized his work and those who have adopted his theories to interpret what he has written to suit themselves. The majority of interpretations, it should be said, can be justified in terms of what Grice actually wrote, although some appear to be rather perverse interpretations of what he meant. What is striking, however, is how few of those who have drawn so heavily on Grice's theories appear to have noticed the many ambiguities which exist in his work, or, if they have noticed, have taken the trouble to define the way in which they themselves have interpreted the concept of conversational coop- eration or are using the term 'cooperative.'
Outlined below are the most strikingly divergent interpretations of Grice's theory, followed by dis- cussion of the different shades withineach view.Com- mon to all interpretations is the assumption that the speaker (S) and hearer (H) have some shared interest in conforming to certain linguistic and pragmatic norms, and in a typical conversation they do so. How- ever, the question is what it means to conform to linguistic and pragmatic norms.
The most extreme view, which is introduced here only in order to dismiss it totally as a complete mis- interpretation of what Grice was concerned to do, says that the maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner must at all times be observed at the level
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