Page 47 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

and above observable events, a reality which may not be directly observable, but which causes those events to occur. A realist, for instance, would interpret the term 'gravitational force' as describing a physical reality which brings about certain observable events, such as objects falling to earth and airplanes remain- ing within the earth's orbit. It may not be possible to observe gravitational force directly, but its existence is postulated as a causal factor in bringing about a wide range of events which are observable. The instru- mentalist claims that such an interpretation of theor- etical constructs is unwarranted, and all that can be justifiably asserted about terms like 'gravitational for- ce' is that they permit a certain measure of success in predicting and ordering the events in question. The instrumentalist's objection is to the idea of a non- observable reality 'hidden,' as it were, behind observ- able events. The emphasis, for the instrumentalist, is on science as being concerned with that which is strictly observable.
A case of conflict between realist and instru- mentalist views of science, which is often cited, con- cerns the realist interpretation given by Galileo of the heliocentric theory concerning the Earth and the sun. The objection raised by the Catholic Church was not to the theory per se, but to Galileo's realist interpret- ation of it, under which it was held to describe a physical reality (the earth's solar system). The Church was prepared to accept only an instrumentalist interpretation of the theory, under which it was seen merely as a useful means of predicting movements of heavenly bodies.
Instrumentalist viewsofsciencehavebeencommon throughout the history of science (for an introduction to the issues, set in a historical perspective, see Popper 1963). In the twentieth century, when the theory of the atom first began to be developed, many physicists wished to deny the reality of atoms, and to accept an instrumentalist interpretation of atomic theory. Instrumentalist interpretations of science were com- mon among the group of philosophers, active in the 1930s, known as the Vienna Circle. Their philo-
sophical position, known as logical positivism, influ- enced work done in linguistics in America at the time; and this is said to be evident in the work of the Post- Bloomfieldians (see, for instance, Twaddell 1957 for an instrumentalist interpretation of phonological constructs).
For the Post-Bloomfieldians, if linguistics were to be scientific, it must concern itself with observable events, and not with, for instance, unobservable 'men- tal states.' Chomsky is said to have rejected such instrumentalism in favor of a realist interpretation of linguistic theory, under which theoretical terms refer to unobservable linguistic realities which lie behind observable linguistic behavior. For Chomsky, these are mental states (see Chomsky 1986).
Although Chomsky's realist interpretation of linguistic theory is widely accepted within generative linguistics, it is common to find generative linguists withholding any bold claims as to the reality of the objects, structures, and relations they postulate. In one generative theory of syntax which emerged in the 1980s, there was an explicit denial as to the psycho- logical reality of the objects and structures postulated. However, to deny that one's theory characterizes a psychological reality need not commit one to instru- mentalism. A realist interpretation could be supplied for those objects which is not psychological in nature. (For a fuller account of instrumentalism in linguistics, cf. Carr 1990: ch. 3.)
See also: Realism.
Bibliography
Carr P1990 LinguisticRealities.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Chomsky N 1986 Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use.Praeger, New York
Popper K 1963 Three views concerning human knowledge. In: Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Twaddell W F 1957 On denning the phoneme. In: Joos M B (ed.) Readings in Linguistics, vol. 1. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL
'Linguistic philosophy' is the name often given to the conception of philosophical problems as problems about meaning or meanings. Until the twentieth century, no important philosopher held all philo-
sophical problems to be of this nature. For example, Hobbes (1651) thought that truth consists in 'the right ordering of names in our affirmations,' and asked whether, in a language in which predication was ex-
Linguistic Philosophy L. J. Cohen
Linguistic Philosophy
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