Page 481 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

do A. S intends to produce K by means of the rec- ognition of i-i, and he intends i-i to be recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of the meaning of [U].' Searle calls this 'counts as' condition 'the essential rule.' Others have adopted or adapted it into an 'illocutionary intention.'
A survey of speech act definitions in Searle (1969), Bach and Harnish (1979), Edmondson (1981), Lev- inson (1983), Allan (1986), and Wierzbicka (1987) reveals great similarity despite the different per- spectives of these scholars. The obligatory com- ponents of the definitions of illocutions are the preparatory condition and S's illocutionary intention. The prepositional or utterance content will be either given or inferable from one or both of these. Finally, as was suggested in Sect. 5, a single sincerity condition holds for all acts.
9. Being Literal or Nonliteral, Direct or Indirect, On- record or Off-record
An indirect speech act is one in which S performs one illocutionary act (e.g., stating It's cold in here), but intends H to infer by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, another illocution (e.g., requesting the heating to be turned up); cf. Searle (1975b: 61), Bach and Harnish (1979:70). Sadock (1974) identified some exotic species of indirect acts: 'whimperatives' indirectly request (the function of the imperative in Sadock's view) by means of S directly asking a ques- tion, for example, Can't you (please) do A? and Do A, will you? (this analysis is criticized in Allan 1986:216); using a 'queclarative,' S directly questions and indirectly makes an assertion—Does anyone do A any more? means 'Nobody does A any more'; 'requestions' are quiz questions to which S knows the answer, for example, Columbus discovered America in? Because the clause-type determines the direct or primary illo- cution, most speech acts are indirect; so, rather than postulating a binary distinction (direct versus indirect), it is preferable to allow for an open-ended series of illocutions ranged from the primary illocution (determined by clause-type) to the last illocution that can be inferred from a given utterance (which is the illocutionary point).
The study of indirect speech acts has over- whelmingly dealt with requests. Blum-Kulka, et al. (1989:18) identify nine points on an indirectness scale for requests. Their 'direct strategies' are used when S is dominant: (a) imperative Clean up that mess; (b) performative / 'm asking you to clean up that mess; (c) hedged performatives / would like to ask you to come
for a check-up; (d) obligation statements You'll have to move that car; (e) want statements / want you to stop calling me. What they call 'conventionally indirect strategies' are H-oriented: (f) suggestory formulas How about cleaning up?; (g) query preparatory (Sadock's 'whimperatives') Could/Will you clear up
the kitchen, please? Finally, their 'nonconventionally indirect strategies' are off-record: (h) strong hints You'veleft thekitcheninadreadful mess;(i)mildhints / say, it's a bit chilly in here, isn't it? (said when the
heating is off and the window open).
The contrast between direct and indirect illocution
is muddied by the related contrasts between being on- record versus off-record, and being literal or nonlit- eral. Blum-Kulka, et al.'s 'nonconventional indirect' requests could be classified 'off-record'; the 'direct' and 'conventionally indirect' ones 'on-record' because an on-record U spells out the message explicitly. Note that S can be on-record and either direct or indirect; but if S is off-record, s/he is necessarily indirect. For someone who is not very close to S to respond to the invitation Do you want to come to a movie tonight? with the bald-on-record refusal No is downright offensive. To avoid giving offence, people hedge, apo- logize, prevaricate, and speak off-record, giving reasons for not accepting the invitation or complying with the request. Thus, to politely refuse the invi- tation, one says things like / have to wash my hair or I'd love to, but my mother's coming to dinner tonight. Note that these might be literally meant on-record statements of S's plans, but their illocutionary point is indirect and off-record refusal.
A nonliteral U such as the sarcastic / 'm sure the cat likes you pulling its tail is an indirect, off-record request for H to desist. What makes it nonliteral is that S does not really mean it as a direct assertion about what the cat likes; in other words, it is the illocution which is nonliteral. However, there is no reason to believe that the literal meaning of Max is a bastard is any more direct than an utterance intending the nonliteral meaning of 'bastard'; furthermore, both interpret- ations are on-record. The psycholinguistic evidence (cf. Gernsbacher 1990:89) is that all possible senses of a language expression are activated, and context then suppresses the activation of inappropriate mean- ings; consequently, there is no reason to believe that the nonliteral meaning of a lexically ambiguous term takes longer to process than its literal meaning; and there are therefore no grounds at all for suggesting that it is less 'direct.' What is nonliteral in the last example is the locution, not the illocution. Take another, problematic example: If it's not Schlitz, it's not beer. This is a direct, on-record assertion, but it is nonliteral because S does not really mean that a can of Budweiser or Foster's is not beer, though S might literally mean that in S's opinion (but not everybody's) Budweiser and Foster's lack the properties necessary for it to be properly classified as beer. Thus, one con- cludes that S is indirectly asserting the opinion that Schlitz is the best beer—and literally means this; there will be different views on whether or not this opinion is on the record.
It is not enough to retain the term 'indirect illo- cution' only for an illocution that is either off-record
Speech Act Theory: Overview
459