Page 507 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

2. JudgmentandTruth
Kant regards language as the expression of thought, though he also describes thinking as inner speech. Thought consists in makingjudgements, and he claims that logic, by revealing that there are twelve fun- damental types of judgment, shows there are twelve ways in which the mind can act. It is because concepts also involve mental activity that he thinks there must correspondingly be twelve fundamental concepts, the categories.
Judgments may be either analytic or synthetic. Ana- lytic judgments are those whose truth can be deter- mined 'in accordance with the Principle of Contradiction,' or by means of logical laws and con- ceptual analysis: such as 'All unmarried men are unmarried,' or, equivalently, 'All bachelors are unmarried.' All other judgments are synthetic. Kant considers mathematical, as well as metaphysical, judg- ments to be synthetic, though also a priori.
Truth is correspondence: 'the agreement of knowl- edge with its object.' Judgments about things in them- selves may be true, but there is no way for us to know they are. Judgments about the phenomenal world, however, can be shown to 'agree with their objects' by establishing their coherence with what is given to us empirically in sensation, in accordance with those forms and principles which our minds supply.
3. AestheticsandMoralPhilosophy
The appreciation of beauty is a matter of feeling, not reason, but in The Critique of Judgment (1790) Kant argues that it can be expected of everyone nonetheless. It arises whenever something appears well-adapted to our cognitive faculties, without our being able fully to capture why. The moral law, in contrast, is purely rational. In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788), he argues it is an imperative which is 'categorical' in that it must be obeyed for its own sake, not for the sake of
any further end to be achieved by it (like the pro- motion of happiness). Only actions performed out of respect for the moral law have genuine moral worth; actions which accord with the law, but are done for some other motive (e.g., because one feels generous), do not. Being purely rational, the categorical impera- tive must bind all rational beings universally. It can be formulated, 'Act only on those principles of action which you can rationally will as universal law.'
4. KantToday
Kant's influence is pervasive, but one or two points may be specially noticed. In moral philosophy his conception of the law as a rational motive has often been dismissed, but recently there have been inter- esting attempts to give a greater place to rational motivation along roughly Kantian lines. Tran- scendental idealism also has its supporters, but since Kant's own day people have often been unconvinced by his retention of things in themselves. Many, also, have been unconvinced by the idealistic aspect—the conception of the phenomenal world as in part a prod- uct of our minds. The most trenchant of these has been Strawson, who nevertheless finds the key to metaphysics in Kantian transcendental arguments.
Bibliography
Allison H E 1983 Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Yale Uni- versity Press, New Haven, CT
Guyer P (ed.) 1992 The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cam- bridge University Press, Cambridge
Kant I 1929 (trans. Kemp Smith N) The Critique of Pure Reason. Macmillan, London
Kant I 1948 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. In: Paton H J (ed. and trans.) The Moral Law. Hutchinson, London
Kemp J 1968 The Philosophy of Kant. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Scruton R 1982Kant. Oxford University Press, Oxford Strawson P F 1966 The Bounds of Sense. Methuen, London Sullivan R J 1994 An Introduction to Kant's Ethics. Cam-
bridge University Press,Cambridge
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is most reputed as a phil- osopher, the designer of one of the great sytems of philosophy, and as a mathematician, co-inventor of the differential and integral calculus. He was, in fact, a universal genius, who made important contributions
to almost every field of scientific investigation. Thus he was also alchemist, jurist, engineer, logician, historian, and linguist.
Leibniz was born in Leipzig, Germany, in 1646, the son of a professor of philosophy. At the age of 20, he
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm R. C. de Vrijer
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
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