Page 518 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Key Figures
at one point of time, this name becomes applicable only to one object.
2. Mill'sFundamentalDistinction
Mill considers the distinction between connotative and nonconnotative names as fundamental to the nat- ure of language. A connotative name is defined as one which denotes a subject and implies an attribute. A denotative name is a name which only denotes a subject. According to Mill all general concrete names are connotative. The name woman denotes an indefi- nite number of individuals. It is applied to them because they possess and to express that they possess certain attributes. Heloise is called a woman because she possesses rationality, corporeity, animal life. If she missed one of these attributes, one would start questioning the application of the name woman to her. The use of a connotative name is dependent on the continuance of the attributes which the name connotes. By calling Heloise a woman, we entail that she possesses all those attributes at the point of ref- erence—although she may lack some of them at the point of speech. By using a connotative name the information is conveyed that the object so named has the attributes connoted by the name. Mill recognizes
that in some cases it is not easy to determine precisely theconnotation ofaname.Sometimesitisimpossible to say precisely how much an individual must deviate from the beings called a woman, in order to refuse the name woman to it. In such cases the meaning of the name is unsettled and vague. But he finds relief in the idea that cases will appear in which the ends of language are better promoted by vagueness than by complete precision. Proper names, on the other hand, are denotative. Heloise denotes Heloise but fails to connote any attribute belonging to her. Proper names are marks attached to the objects to enable these objects to become subjects of discourse. They answer the purpose of fixing the thing being talked about, but they do not answer the purpose of telling something about that thing. On Mill's view the expression Tully is Cicero conveys that both names are marks for the same object. Mill asserts that there might have been a reason for calling Dartmouth Dartmouth, but once this name was given, the use of the name became independent of the reason. Suppose this town Dart- mouth is called because it is situated at the mouth of the River Dart. If the course of the river were changed, one would not necessarily be inclined to change the name of the town. Mill holds that the use of proper names can be linked to information flow, but that is
not something connected with the meaning of the name. Saying to someone this is Heloise does not convey to them any information about Heloise— except that Heloise is the name of the person we point at. By enabling them to pick out Heloise, they may connect her with information they might have. Thus, this is Heloise may elucidate the bit of information
'this is the wife of Abelard.' But the name does not imply this information. If the person one is talking to does not have the information Heloise is the wife of AbelardhewillbeunabletolinkthisisHeloisetothis is the wife of Abelard. But one shall not say that he does not know the meaning of Heloise, one shall rather say that he is not aware of a piece of intellectual history. Mill strongly links the meaning of a name with its connotation and not with its denotation. He holds that meaning resides not in what names denote but in what they connote. A person might know every individual to whom a name can be applied and yet could not be said to know the meaning of the name. A child knows the denotation of the name 'parents' long before it knows the meaning of this name. Mill's theory of meaning establishes that if the meaning of a general term were identical with the things it is applied to, no general name has fixed meaning except by acci- dent. The only way in which a general name has a definite meaning is by being the name of an indefinite number of individuals which possess the attributes connoted by it. Proper names are the only names of objects which connote nothing and have, strictly
speaking, no meaning. The other individual terms are connotative. The name thefather of Socrates,as well as denoting Sophroniscus, connotes the attribute of having Socrates as a son. Mill concedes that two names denoting the same object may have a difference in meaning. For example, the father of Socrates and Sophroniscus denote the same individual. But they are not identical in meaning, since the proper name has no meaning at all. If denotation were meaning, then identity of denotation would imply identity of meaning.
3. Mill's View on Propositions
In Mill's view a proposition is a discourse in which something is affirmed or denied of something. A propo- sition is formed by putting two names together. Every proposition consists of three parts: the name denoting that which is affirmed or denied—the predi- cate; the name denoting the thing which something is affirmed or denied of—the subject; the word showing that there is an affirmation or denial—the copula. In the proposition The earth is round, the predicate is the word round, the subject is the word the earth, the copula is the word is. Mill observes that the copula is not the only means of showing that a name is predicate to another. In fire burns, the inflection of the verb to burn shows that this sentence can be used to predicate burn of fire. However, he considers that the copula is the most commonly used sign of predication. He warns the reader about the ambiguity of the verb to be. It has already been said that in an identity sentence the copula expresses that both individual names denote the same object. He also notices that in Man is mortal the copula signifies inclusion between classes while in Socrates is a philosopher the copula indicates
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