Page 521 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

(o) falls under a concept (F) is clarified by listing conditionals of the form:
If o is F, then, if we were to perform action A, experience e would result.
If salt is soluble, then if stirred vigorously in water, it would dissolve. Applying this rule to propositions of 'ontological metaphysics' reveals them to be empty. It is also proposed as fundamental to scientific meth- odology: its use clarifies how the experimental test is relevant to evaluating an hypothesis.
In 1905, Peirce renamed his doctrine 'pragmaticism' in order to distance his position from that of William James, and from the sort of position later expressed in the logical positivists' verification principle. Unlike these thinkers, he did not insist that the conditionals used to clarify a concept be analytic (true by virtue of meaning): they can reflect current scientific knowledge and thus grow and develop as science progresses. And he later grew emphatic that the principle required a realist account of subjunctiveconditionals, or 'would bes': his own scientific metaphysics included an 'extreme' realism about universals and natural necessity. Much of his later work on semiotic was motivated by the desire to prove that no scientifically relevant aspect of meaning remains unclarified by the pragmatist principle.
The most famous application of the pragmatist principle is Peirce's theory of truth or reality. If a proposition is taken to be true, it is thought to be 'fated to be agreed upon by all who investigate' it: if anyone were to inquire long enough and well enough into whether that proposition was true, it is 'fated' or 'destined' that he will eventually arrive at a stable belief in it. As the examples above suggest, using the principle to clarify a proposition or concept relates it to a set of expectations, and this can present problems in connection with propositions about the past: they are transformed into propositions about future evidence.
4. Conclusion
Peirce's published writings and his extensive manu- scripts contained detailed discussions of many issues about language. He explained the nature of assertion, linking this to a view of science as an institution based upon a practice of challenging and defending assertions (Brock 1974), He used this theory to sketch an approach to the semantics of quantifiers which is similar to Hintikka's recent game-theoretic semantics. There are explanations of the use of proper names and of the ability to refer to abstract objects, and many passages attempt to remedy the lack Peirce noted by remarking that 'logicians have been at fault in giving vagueness the go-by' (Peirce 1931-58, vol. 2:293). Finally his writing on the semiotic of metaphor has influenced a number of authors working on the under- standing of figurative language (e.g., Shapiro 1983).
Bibliography
Anderson D R 1995 Strands of System: The Philosophy of Charles Peirce. Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, IN
Brock J E 1974 Peirce's conception of semiotic. Semiotica 14:124^1
Hookway C J 1985 Peirce. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Liszka J J 1996 A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of CharlesS.Peirce.IndianaUniversityPress, Bloomington, IN
Peirce C S 1931-58 Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, 8 vols. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Peirce C S 1977 Semiotic and Signifies. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN
Peirce C S 1982-86 The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. Indiana University Press, Bloom- ington, IN
Ransdell J 1977 Some leading ideas of Peirce's semiotic. Semiotica 19:157-78
Shapiro M 1983 The Sense of Grammar. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN
Short T L 1981 Semiosis and intentionality. Transactionsof the Charles S. Peirce Society 17:197-223
Skagestad P 1981 The Road of Inquiry. Columbia University Press, New York
The basic notion of grammar on which all later Greeks built was developed by various nameless people between Homer and Socrates. The few whose names are still known (other than mythical ones like Cadmus, the bringer of the Phoenician alphabet to Thebes) are all of the fifth century, some called 'sophists,' others
'philosophers,' and it is mainly from Plato that one learns of them.
1. The Beginnings
In the second book of the Iliad, at the beginning of the Trojan catalog (2.804), the goddess Iris offers a
Plato and His Predecessors
1 F. W. Householder
Plato and His Predecessors
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