Page 92 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Language and Mind
sically connected to the ability to think various other thoughts. So, for example, anyone who can form the thought 'the ruthless spy has seen the desperate ter- rorist' can also form the thoughts 'the desperate ter- rorist has seen the ruthless spy' and 'the desperate spy has seen the ruthless terrorist,' etc. The parallel with natural language is obvious and the explanation for the productivity and systematicityof naturallanguage is its combinatorial syntax and semantics, so it is natu- ral to assume that thought too has combinatorial structure. However, see Clark (1994) and Maloney (1994) for a range of objections to the LOT thesis.
3. TheRelationbetweenThoughtandPublicLanguage
Fodor believes that the semanticity of natural lang- uage, that is, the capacity of natural languagesymbols to be about the world, is dependent on the rep- resentationality of thought. So the answer to the ques- tion 'How is it that the sentence, Mrs Thatcher has resigned is about Margaret Thatcher?' is something like: 'Because that sentence is a vehicle forexpressing a thought about Margaret Thatcher.' On this view an account of the semanticity of natural language will follow from an account of how it is that thoughts refer to the world. Attempts are being made to develop this logically prior theory of 'psychosemantics' (see, for
example, Millikan 1984, Fodor 1987b, and Fodor 1990), though they are as yet embryonic.
See also: Intentionality. Bibliography
Clark A 1994 Language of thought (2). In: Guttenplan S (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell, Oxford
Fodor J 1975The Language of Thought. Harvester Press, Sussex
Fodor J 1981 Representations. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Fodor J 1987a Why there still has to be a language of
thought. In: Fodor J Psychosemantics. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA
Fodor J 1987b Psychosemantics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Fodor J 1990 A Theory of Content. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA
Lycan W G 1990 The language of thought hypothesis. In:
Lycan W G (ed.) Mind and Cognition: A Reader.
Blackwell, Oxford
Maloney J C 1994 Language of thought (1).In: Guttenplan
S (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell,
Oxford
Millikan R 1984 Language, Thought and Other Biological
Categories. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Sperber D, Wilson D 1995 Relevance: Communication and
Cognition, 2nd edn.Blackwell, Oxford
Sterelney K 1990 The Representational Theory of Mind.
Blackwell, Oxford
The term 'private language' has several customary uses. For example, sometimes it refers to the phenom- enon of children talking to themselves. Or it might refer to codes or idiosyncratic sign systems formulated for particular purposes, perhaps for private com- munication within a group. This article will discuss a special notion of private language which stems from Ludwig Wittgenstein, and is related to what has be-
1 come known as 'the private language argument (i.e.,
Wittgenstein's argument against private language). This conception and the problems related to it con- cern foundational issues in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The questions to be addressed are: W hat is a private language in this sense? Why should Wittgenstein (or anyone) bother with it? What might an argument against it be? What is Wittgenstein's argument? (By way of proviso, it should be noted that there is a conception of W ittgen- stein's later philosophy according to which his pur- pose is not to argue against positions, but to present alternative pictures, so as to show a picture not to
be compulsory. On that view, Wittgenstein has no 'private language argument.' This view of Wittgen- stein is largely neglected in what follows. But it should be borne in mind.)
1. Preliminaries on Privacy
Wittgenstein introduces the notion of a private language in Philosophical Investigations Sect. 243:
But is a language conceivable in which one could record, or articulate, his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, etc.—for his own use?—Can't we do that in our usual language?—But I don't mean it like that. The words of this language would apply to what only its speaker can know; to his direct, private, experiences. So anothercan- not understand this language.
(The term 'private language' does not occur before Sect. 256, where it appears in quotation marks.)
Privacy may come in various strengths, according to what makes language private. Private language might
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Private Language C. Travis