Page 61 - BNE_magazine_06_2019

bne June 2019
Opinion 61
limiting anonymity in an effort to gain greater control over the internet.
Material determined to be “extremist” or a “threat to public order” – both loosely defined pretexts for censorship – can
be blocked and potentially land posters in jail while the communications watchdog Roskomnadzor maintains an active blacklist for a host of services to follow.
As of March, showing “blatant disrespect” for officials or publishing “fake news” will also get you in trouble. Online privacy has suffered too. Telecommunications operators and companies have been told to save the data and metadata of users and give the security services access to their encryption keys. Social media and communication platforms are required to link accounts to phone numbers while blogs with more than 3,000 daily readers must sign up to an official register. Virtual private networks (VPNs) have new restrictions too.
Some of these laws have been better implemented than others. Some have hardly been implemented at all. Often clumsy and chaotic, it would be easy to be cynical about Moscow's efforts. But the intent remains the same – gain control over the online world at the expense of internet freedoms.
Laws and limits
In many ways the new sovereign internet law is a fitting culmination to the campaign. It seeks to replicate what is essentially a physical on/off switch for the internet by forcing service providers to use Russian based, government controlled exchange points (these are the things that stitch together to form paths for information to flow).
New sophisticated equipment will need to be installed to allow regulators to better monitor and block a host of internet traffic – webpages, messaging apps, VPNs etc – giving Moscow the power to cut the country off from the rest of the worldwide web in a time of crisis.
The law also sets out the creation of a Russian alternative to the global Domain Name System (DNS). The DNS is a complex, flexible system that allows seamless internet traffic. It gets us to the webpages we type into our browser. It is also reliant on an international mix of levers and pulleys to help it operate. Moscow wants its own independent version to give it ultimate control over server access as well as the ability to keep the inter- net running should it decide to isolate itself. This government managed DNS will, apparently, be operational by 2021.
All this is incredibly complicated and there is little detail
out there on how Moscow intends to meet the inevitable challenges. Throughout the process the bill's authors showed limited tech knowledge and often failed to answer the most basic of questions. Concern over consequences for cross border traffic and interconnected services, as well as the risks of centralised management, have yet to be addressed. The procurement, installation and long-term maintenance of new
equipment will be difficult and costly. And while the project will no doubt allow for lucrative, cost ballooning contracts for state-owned and Kremlin friendly businesses, it may also highlight what is an underfunded domestic tech industry.
Indeed, do not expect a Russian equivalent of China's
'Great Firewall' any time soon. Beijing is leading the drive towards internet sovereignty because of decades of hard work with levels of resources and capabilities simply unavailable
“While trust in television is in decline, affordable internet access across the country has grown as huge amounts of Russians use it to communicate”
to Moscow. Beijing developed its censorship infrastructure in real-time, with China's population knowing little else. Moscow's accumulation of control is retrospective, with a population that has become accustomed to a (generally) free internet with access to staples of online culture like Twitter, Facebook, You- Tube, cloud services and messaging apps. If the financial costs could spiral, so could the political ones. The internet is embed- ded in much of Russian life and has produced a tech-savvy youth who will not give it up easily. So why is Moscow trying?
Securitisation
Since Putin's return to power in 2012 a narrative of 'fortress Russia' has dominated politics. Elevating the state has allowed Moscow to legitimise a cycle of securitisation across society, where enemies are generalised amalgamations of past and future threats. This brand of statism – hardly unique to
Russia – creates a power dynamic that demands extraordinary measures to protect. It can be seen in the language used to justify the sovereign internet law on vague national security grounds as a defensive, pre-emptive act to shield Russia from foreign aggression.
But the new law has a lot more to do with threats from
inside the country than out. The online world challenges the Kremlin's traditional interpretation of political control. While trust in television is in decline, affordable internet access across the country has grown as huge amounts of Russians use it to communicate, be entertained and informed. YouTube, which vies with the likes of Channel One for views, hosts Alexei Navalny's corruption investigations. Telegram channels are a haven for insider gossip and government leaks. And much like 2011/12, a host of social media platforms are used to organise anti-government demonstrations. The internet merges offline and online worlds in a way that is difficult to manage, let alone dictate and it terrifies the Kremlin.
We got a brief insight into the lengths Moscow is willing to go to when, in October and March, mobile internet was cut dur-
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