Page 7 - bne IntelliNews Country Report: Russia Dec17
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percent   of   their   debt   per   year.   Repayment   requirements   increase   to   10   percent in   2020,   then   20   percent   in   2021.   The   back-loaded   repayment   scheme   is   just another   way   for   Russia’s   leadership   to   delay   the   pain,   but   it   risks   applying   the most   pressure   at   the   most   inopportune   time,   just   as   the   Kremlin   begins   the difficult   process   of   managing   Putin’s   succession.
Seeking   to   ensure   that   the   regions   comply   with   their   repayment   obligations, the   Ministry   of   Finance   announced   new   sanctions   on   regions   threatened   by default.   According   to   the   new   rules,   if   a   region   misses   an   interest   payment (unlikely,   since   the   federal   budget   loans   have   just   a   .1   percent   annual   rate)   or miss   a   repayment   on   principal   (more   likely),   the   region   will   theoretically   be forced   to   repay   the   rest   of   their   debt   to   the   center   all   at   once.   Theoretically,   at least,   as   some   doubt   Moscow’s   preparedness   to   stick   to   its   own   rules.   Moody’s analyst   Vladlen   Kuznetsov   told   RBC   that   he   expects   the   Ministry   of   Finance   to take   “a   rather   flexible   stance   in   these   cases   to   avoid   a   regional   default.”   The Director   of   the   Independent   Institute   of   Regional   Policy,   Natalya   Zubarevich,   is also   skeptical.   “2018   will   pass,   and   we’ll   see   if   it’s   possible,   for   example,   for Mordovia   and   Khakassia   to   reduce   their   deficit   and   debt.   While   they   have   only been   building   them   up,   no   one   has   been   held   responsible,”   she   says,   adding that   she   does   not   interpret   the   Ministry   of   Finance’s   statements   literally.   “Final decisions   on   imposing   financial   sanctions   on   debtor-regions,”   Zubarevich notes,   “will   not   be   made   by   the   Ministry   of   Finance.   Rather,   they   will   be   made in   the   Kremlin.”
“Final   decisions   on   imposing   financial   sanctions   on   debtor-regions,” Zubarevich   notes,   “will   not   be   made   by   the   Ministry   of   Finance.   Rather,   they will   be   made   in   the   Kremlin.”
The   regional   governors   find   themselves   caught   between   a   rock   and   a   hard place.   The   Kremlin   continues   to   pressure   even   the   most   indebted   regions   to fulfill   the   May   Decrees   –   but   the   Ministry   of   Finance’s   new   rules   also   limit   the regions’   maneuverability.   Regions   with   debt   problems   are   officially   prohibited from   seeking   new   loans   from   banks   at   interest   rates   higher   than   the   “key   rate   + 1   percent”   formula.   This   restriction   could   prove   problematic   for   some   of Russia’s   most   underwater   regions.   In   September,   notes   RBC,   Mordovia   took   a loan   at   11.5   percent,   despite   a   key   rate   of   8.5   percent.   The   federal government’s   simultaneous   demand   of   decree   fulfillment   and   fiscal responsibility   bodes   poorly   for   Russia’s   economy,   says   Zubarevich:   “Some regions   will   simply   cut   down   all   expenditures   on   the   national   economy,   where possible,   and   not   invest   in   development   at   all   –   but   they   will   fulfill   the   decrees.”
At   least   officially,   the   Kremlin   has   made   clear   that   governors   will   now   be   held accountable   for   debt   problems   in   their   regions.   On   November   15,   Putin   signed a   decree   doubling   the   number   of   indicators   with   which   the   central   authorities will   assess   regional   governor   performance.   Debt,   for   the   first   time,   features prominently.   Governors   must   report   their   region’s   debt-to-revenue   ratio (without   counting   fiscal   transfers   as   revenue)   annually.   Superficially,   additional indicators   mean   added   scrutiny   for   regional   governors.   But   Russian   political observer   Nikolay   Petrov   sees   a   different   logic:   “In   fact,   it   seems   to   me   that   the more   indicators,   the   less   rigid   and   strict   evaluation   becomes...when   you   have 24   indicators,   the   picture   is   less   straightforward.”   More   flexible   evaluation, Petrov   adds,   means   greater   flexibility   for   the   Kremlin   to   replace   regional governors.   “On   one   hand,   your   hands   are   untied   and   any   governor   can   be accused   and   changed   because   some   indicators   look   worse   than   they   ought   to. And   on   the   other   hand,   it   is   impossible   to   objectively   assess   the   performance
7       RUSSIA  Country  Report   December    2017                                                                                                                                                                                www.intellinews.com


































































































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