Page 8 - GEORptMar21

also made him a champion of far-right forces, like the Asaval-Dasavali newspaper that has frequently assaulted relatively liberal representatives of the GD but has hailed Garibashvili as a true patriot.
The change was generally anticipated. There had been persistent rumours in recent months that Gakharia, who had become an increasingly isolated figure in the government, had lost Ivanishvili’s trust and would depart soon; Garibashvili was often presumed to be a likely replacement. However, the current circumstances made it much more meaningful than it would otherwise have been.
In this dramatic moment, Gakharia’s resignation – even though nobody in the ruling team shared his reservations – was a painful blow for the government. Gakharia had a reputation as a hard-liner himself. His public image was defined by the so-called “Gavrilov night” of 20-21 June 2019 when in his capacity as the minister of internal affairs he led a violent dispersal of the protest demonstration, which, as many critics alleged, was unnecessarily heavy-handed. Coming from this kind of person, the criticism of the government's actions as excessively severe was rather embarrassing. The opposition perceived this as its moral victory.
Moreover, it was a signal for heavier criticism from the West. When the opposition declared the October 2020 parliamentary election fraudulent and refused to take their seats in parliament, the international community considered this a misjudgment and urged the opposition to “work through the institutions”. This was the first case in a long time when the GD could claim the West was supporting it in its stand-off with the opposition. Apparently, they saw this as a chance to divide the opposition by enticing smaller opposition parties into parliament and fully marginalising the UNM (they largely failed in this). They also might have considered this a good time to strengthen pressure against the opposition by reviving charges against Melia that go back to the mentioned “Gavrilov night”.
This strategy backfired. The threat of Melia’s arrest unified the opposition and, moreover, triggered a new wave of criticism from Western politicians and diplomats. Gakharia’s resignation may serve as a signal for this criticism becoming stronger – this is already happening. Lithuanian Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee chair Zygimantas Pavilionis came to Tbilisi to convince both sides to compromise and renew foreign-facilitated post-election talks. He also raised the possibility of sanctions if the government went forward with its plans to arrest the opposition leader.
Garibashvili’s appointment and the GD rhetoric in the following days signal that GD is in no mood for compromise. This may still change; but this would require, in addition to unity, perseverance, and prudence from the opposition, stronger pressure from the EU and US. The weight of Lithuania, or individual western politicians who voiced their concerns, may not be sufficient.
Whatever the outcome, there is a widely shared perception that this may be a make-or-break moment. Georgia may take a significant step towards becoming a more autocratic country and its European future may be seriously jeopardised. Or, there will be yet another opening.
8 GEORGIA Country Report March 2021 www.intellinews.com