Page 8 - MEOG Week 11

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provide the Kurds with a financial lifeline. Thou- sands of barrels of oil per day have been flowing from Syria into iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurd- istan region, in an opaque trade that has served for several years as a financial lifeline for the Kurdish-led government in northern Syria and its military wing, the SDF.
The latest developments follow Turkey’s fruit- less initiative in irbil Province, where President Erdogan was unable to dictate terms to Syria and its Russian backer. At their march 5 meet- ing Putin and Erdogan agreed to a deal that preserves the Syrian army’s gains in idlib since January and calls for a security corridor stretch- ing to a depth of 6km either side of the key m4 highway.
Coming away from a meeting with President Putin with very little, Erdogan made a proposal to moscow to strip the Syrian Kurds of oil rev- enues in their heartlands of Qamishi and Deir ez-Zor and use the money to finance Turkish construction projects in Syria. Erdogan, who has long prioritised the construction sector as a key driving force in the Turkish economy, may be entertaining hopes to prop up the sector, badly hit by economic turmoil at home.
Erdogan has linked his Syria policy to the SDF or the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its political arm, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which helps suppress domestic questioning of Turkey’s military campaigns in Syria. The YPG and the PYD are seen as affili- ates of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the armed group that has fought Ankara since 1984 and is listed as a terrorist group by Turkey and much of the international community.
Yet Turkey’s recent operation against the Syr- ian army in idlib has failed to convince not only the opposition, but reportedly also some quar- ters in the military. The campaign, dubbed Oper- ation Spring Shield, has been openly criticised by a number of senior retired officers and has fuelled public questioning over the high number of Turkish casualties.
Erdogan’s plan to move up to 2 million refu- gees to new settlements in a safe zone to the east of the Euphrates in north-eastern Syria would involve the construction of 140 villages and 10 towns to accommodate, respectively, 5,000 and 30,000 people each. The cost of a total of 200,000
housing units was estimated at some 151bn Turkish liras ($26bn).
Giving Turkey a share in Syria’s postwar reconstruction in return for Ankara cutting support for armed groups, ending the fighting and ultimately withdrawing its troops from Syria is a notion that Putin himself has tried to use to entice Erdogan. Yet Erdogan’s latest proposal tar- gets the Kurds directly and looks like a recipe for renewed fighting. Such an approach threatens to undermine the Kurds’ links with moscow and Damascus as the Kurds seek to preserve the de facto self-rule they have established. meanwhile, Erdogan’s has stated that Turkey “has no eye” on Syria’s oil and appears to be awaiting the US withdrawal, hoping that Russian influence will somehow get Damascus to acquiesce.
Nevertheless, many believe Syria’s recon- struction process will be too costly, slow and difficult without Turkish involvement amid the ongoing sanctions on Syria. Partnership with Turkey in reconstruction projects may be in Russia’s game plan and Damascus might even- tually acquiesce to it in return for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. The Assad government, how- ever, has been trying to mend fences with Arab states, especially the Gulf monarchies, while arguing that Turkey’s policies threaten not only Syria but the whole Arab world. There is no evidence or sign at present that the Syrian state could consent to a scenario where its oil revenues are funnelled into construction projects lining Turkey’s pockets.
The Kurds remain dependent on the few US forces who act as guardians of the oil, and as long as they remain, neither Damascus nor any other party can approach the oil wells. But if the US troops leave, the Kurds will find themselves in a very vulnerable position.
Hence the Kurds place importance on reach- ing a deal with Damascus before things come to that point — a deal that will seal the status of the SDF and self-rule institutions, including the sharing of oil revenues.
The Kurds believe the Russians are playing the Kurdish card in a bid to keep Erdogan at the negotiating table. The outlook for the Kurds and their oil is by no means clear and remains at the behest of several major players and the vagaries of international diplomacy.™
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w w w . N E W S B A S E . c o m Week 11 18•March•2020