Page 53 - bne_Magazine_July_2018

bne July 2018
Opinion 53
Russia is also supporting Iran's plans to join the Shanghai Coop- eration Organization (SCO). Also known as the Shanghai Pact, the SCO is a Eurasian political, economic, and military organisa- tion founded in 2001 in Shanghai by China, Kazakhstan, Kyr- gyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan were admitted as full members in 2015. Iran has had observer nation status since 2005. The matter was brought up in March last year when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani paid his first official visit to the Kremlin, an occasion that prompted his coun- terpart Vladimir Putin to praise Iran as a “good neighbour”.
Iranian gas won’t easily reach Europe
In the energy sphere, there are major differences between the Russians and Iranians that are not at all easily solved. For instance, both look to the European market to increase gas and oil exports.
Iran is theoretically quite well positioned to take its share of the European gas market as the EU is worried about Russian gas export predominance on its markets. Iranian gas could be a very good tool to assuage European fears, but to export its gas Iran would, for instance, need access to Black Sea ports such as Batumi and Poti in Georgia. Or it might one day attempt to feed gas into the new Southern Gas Corridor set to run to Turkey from Azerbaijan via Georgia and onwards to Italy.
Russia has generally tried to push back against any other regional powers establishing themselves on the Black Sea coast, but the Iranians have made a limited breakthrough there. In late 2016 it was agreed that the Iranians will construct oil-processing facilities near Georgia’s Black Sea city of Supsa on a site of approximately 1.2 square kilometres.
But such successes should not be overestimated. Across the South Caucasus Russia and Turkey are well represented both militarily and economically. Russia successfully obstructs any Iranian moves to establish independent pipelines or rail routes to Armenia and Georgia and then there is the growing number of Trump administration obstacles placed in the way of any foreign companies doing business with Iran. They may not be shifted any time soon.
Another area of latent disagreement in the South Cauca-
sus is the simmering conflict over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, run by ethnic Armenians but internation- ally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. Back in the early 1990s, the Iranian government made some unsuccessful attempts to mediate in the conflict. Since both Armenia and Azerbaijan border Iran it is quite natural to expect Tehran to try to play
a bigger role in such efforts to resolve the stand-off. However, Russia, the dominant power in the conflict resolution process, would be opposed to any Iranian initiatives that would dimin- ish Moscow’s role in bringing Baku and Yerevan to the table.
Russian ‘Eurasianists’ look to Tehran and Ankara as pillars
So, despite their centuries-old rivalry, where might Russia and Iran find a real basis for cooperation? In the past several
years, it has become clear that Russia is very keen on building closer relations with Iran. Why so? The map of Eurasia gives a glimpse into the rationale of the Russian political elite. Russian political thinkers of the 1990s often contended that Iran and Turkey should be pillars of future Russian influence in the Mid- dle East. The so-called Eurasianists, who believe that Russia is neither in Europe nor in Asia, say that to successfully compete with western powers, Moscow needs both Tehran and Ankara.
Under Russian President Vladimir Putin those notions were officially pushed aside, but not in practice. It has been in Russia’s perennial interest to keep Iran at least neutral, something that historically happened during both the Romanov era and the Soviet empire.
Both Russia and Iran loathe seeing any western military encroachment in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Both consider the evolving grand strategy of the US for the Eurasian land mass as negative to their geopolitical imperatives. For Russia, the US violates the post-Cold War order as it ramps up military pressure on Moscow in the
“Putin, time and again, teeters on the edge of a bold advance, then steps back, opts to play it safe”
former Soviet space; for Iran, the US, having ditched the
deal Barack Obama signed to limit Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, is intent on hindering any Iranian geopolitical outreach across the Middle East, including in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. Thus, this common apprehension towards the US can be considered one driver behind close Russo-Iranian cooperation.
The US has unveiled a new national strategy document enumerating the major problems Washington perceives across Eurasia. Russia and Iran feature as the most problematic influences for the US. The unilateral US withdrawal from
the multilateral nuclear accord is a defining moment for the Moscow-Tehran cooperation as Iran waits on what its other signatories, including Russia, will truly do to shield Iranian and foreign companies that do business with Iran from Trump’s turning of the screw with sanctions.
Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles focused on military and political developments across the Eurasian continent.
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