Page 46 - bne_Magazine_September_2018

46 I Southeast Europe bne September 2018
the need to protect its politicians from the consequences of their past actions.
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has repeatedly expounded his concept
of illiberal democracy, first outlining the basic ideas at an infamous address in the Romanian town of Baile Tusnad in 2014 where he claimed to be building an "illib- eral state". Speaking to ethnic Hungar- ians in Romania, the PM declared liberal democracy a failure, and held up Russia, China and Turkey as models for Hungary if it wished to stay competitive globally. Both Russia and China have institutions, as both are simply too large to run on the basis of personal relations with key offi- cials alone. But they are hybrid models where the client-sponsor relations are key and epitomised in Russia’s “verti-
cal power” model. In Turkey’s case the country’s EU ambitions have seen a lot of institution building when the country actually had a chance of joining the EU trade club, but Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan is now working hard to
motivated by concerns over and above political expediency.
In Poland, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) that came to power in 2015 has been pursuing a deeply conservative agenda, for example in its attacks on abortion rights, at the same time as eroding freedom of the media and embarking on a much criticised overhaul of the justice system.
Romania’s PSD has also toyed with conservative ideas, for example with plans (later dropped) for a mass rally
in support of the “traditional family” and discussions of a referendum against same-sex marriages (not yet sched- uled). There popularist ideas are the façade behind which attacks on liberal institutions can be mounted, as they are easy to sell to the population.
However, one of the top grievances of the protesters in Romania is that the changes there – that they fear could
manipulation, went on to stand trial and was given a three year, six month prison sentence – the first time such a senior figure has been convicted.
Similarly, the new changes approved in July stipulate that the offence would be applicable only to public officials whose actions bring benefits to themselves or their close relatives – this would again allow Dragnea to evade justice as the case concerned two county council employees who were working on PSD business, thereby benefitting the party rather than Dragnea himself.
After the events of August 10, even some within the PSD have said the relent-
less focus on judicial changes and its undermining of the anti-corruption fight have to end. A senior member of the party, former education minister and leader of the PSD’s Bucharest branch, Ecaterina Andronescu, wrote in an open letter quoted by Hotnews.ro that “What is happening now within the PSD and in the country is not all right, it has gone
... too far.” Andronescu went on to ask Dragnea to resign, though it’s unlikely that he will. Other PSD members who have stepped forward to criticise the authoritarian party leader tend to be summarily expelled.
No unanimity
The EU didn’t remain silent while Hungary and Poland set about adopting changes that went directly against the core values of the union. At issue is the very foundation of the principles of govern- ment on which the EU is built: liberal and accountable institutions that are designed to protect the interest of the population and place checks and balances on those in power. The accession countries signed up to this model of government when they joined in 2004 and rejecting it now is not an option for Brussels.
In December, the European Commis- sion triggered the “nuclear option”, Article 7, against Warsaw, which may lead to it stripping Poland of its voting rights in the EU for undermining the rule of law.
Meanwhile, Hungary has received warnings for its controversial NGO law
“Across the entire region corruption is not a problem of the system: it is the system”
undo the power of these institutions and has already accumulated a lot of power in his own hands following the constitu- tional changes earlier this year to create an executive presidency.
Four years later, again in a speech to eth- nic Hungarians in Baile Tusnad, Orban called for the advent of "Christian democ- racy”, an ideology he defined as "anti- immigrant" and “anti-multicultural”, standing for the Christian family model.
"There is liberalism in the West, there is no democracy," said Orban, going on to call the European Commission a "symbol of failure."
The ruling Fidesz’ demonisation of immigrants, which was stepped up ahead of the April 2018 election that Orban’s Fidesz won by another superma- jority, successfully tapped into the fears of many Hungarian voters, but was
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destroy the fight against corruption and distort the justice system – are so bla- tantly motivated by self interest – legalis- ing corruption is a very hard sell indeed.
Specifically, they are seen as benefit- ting one man: Liviu Dragnea, the leader of the ruling PSD and arguably the
most powerful man in the country even though he is barred from holding an offi- cial position because of his two criminal convictions.
The decree adopted back in January 2017 set the bar for abuse of office
being a criminal offence at damages of RON200,000 (€44,500 at the time); the damages in the case where Dragnea had been indicted amounted to RON108,612. Had the decree stood, the charges against the PSD leader would have been dropped. Instead the politician, who had already been issued a suspended sen- tence in an earlier case concerning voter