Page 15 - AsianOil Week 33 2021

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economies of Central Asia properly linked in trade and investment to those of South Asia, such as Pakistan and India. Of course, without stability in and cooperation from Afghanistan, the idea will remain a pipe dream.
But Mirziyoyev is nothing if not persistent and in mid-July, addressing the international conference “Central and South Asia: Regional connectivity. Challenges and opportunities”, which took place in the Uzbek capital Tashkent, he expressed the hope that a united Central Asia and South Asia, together with the whole Eura- sian continent, could become a stable, economi- cally developed and prosperous space.
Mirziyoyev talked of a vision in which a Termez-Mazar i Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar rail- way, running from Uzbekistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, would become a key element of the architecture of interconnectedness between Central and South Asia. Uzbekistan is also ambi- tious to develop routes through Afghanistan that would give it access to the oceanic ports of Gwa- dar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran (see below) for export-import purposes (a related cargo truck pilot run took place in June), but, even before the fall of Kabul, the Uzbek leadership was on record as acknowledging the ascendancy of the Taliban and appeared prepared to envi- sion a power-sharing arrangement in Afghani- stan that would include the group prominently. That much emerged from an interview granted last month by Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Komilov to US journalist Dennis Wholey.
“We must know about Afghanistan that there is no ... military solution,” Komilov said in the English-language interview. “We think that this problem must be solved on the base of mutual com- promise between the existing government and the military opposition, the Taliban and others.”
After the conference that Mirziyoyev addressed, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Repub- lic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, together with the US, which make up the C5+1 countries, adopted a joint statement.
It read: “The C5+1 countries affirm their commitment to enhancing engagement through this regional diplomatic platform and seek- ing opportunities to strengthen connectivity between the Central and South Asian regions via trade, transport, and energy links. The C5+1 rec- ognizes that increased connectivity supports its shared goal of a prosperous and secure Central Asia. Visionary ideas for Central Asia’s economic growth and closer ties to the economies of South Asia also reinforce the C5+1’s commitment to strengthening the region’s security and stability, including through Afghan peace negotiations”.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
In June, Kyrgyzstan announced that the elec- tricity transmission project CASA-1000 that it
is developing with Tajikistan to send power to Afghanistan and Pakistan had been temporar- ily suspended because of coronacrisis impacts. The investment had anyway been moving along at a crawl so it’s not as if the pre-suspen- sion schedule for project completion by 2023 had been entirely believable, but once ready to move forward the investment will need to seek security guarantees from the Taliban the way that Turkmenistan will have to with TAPI (see above).
In March, reports said Tajikistan was aiming to supply 1,300 MW to Pakistan via Afghanistan under CASA-1000 project. Under the original terms, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were meant to jointly supply 1,300 MW to Pakistan. Tajikistan has also said it is planning to export 75bn kWh of electricity via CASA-1000 over 15 years after the project completion.
In March, Afghanistan-based Tolo News reported officials as saying only 30% of the CASA-1000 construction on the Afghan section of the power transmission project was complete, a progress level that was not in line with an opti- mistic pledge to complete the Afghan section within this year.
Iran
Once Donald Trump got cracking with his cam- paign to strangle Iran’s economy, it became rare to find any big Iranian investment projects not struggling against US sanctions, but one project that has enjoyed a sanctions-free emergence is the development of Iran’s only oceanic port, Chabahar on the Sea of Oman.
The Chabahar project, being jointly delivered by Iran and India, was seen as so important to Afghanistan’s economic prospects that US offi- cials decided to leave it alone. Its Pakistani rival, Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea, a short distance from Chabahar, is being jointly developed by Islamabad and China.
The objective with Chabahar is to give India an export gateway for Afghanistan and Central Asia and the Central Asian ‘Stans’ an export hub for sending shipments globally. Of course, if the Taliban regime doesn’t play ball then at least the Central Asian parts of those objectives may hit a brick wall.
The Taliban and Shi’ite Iran have long been enemies but if some mutual accommodation can be found other projects to check for pro- gress are the first rail link between Afghani- stan and Iran—the Khaf-Herat railway, which when built could also facilitate Turkey-Af- ghanistan trade via Iranian rail access—and wind farm projects on the Iranian-Afghan border. Analysts say that with 30,000 MWe potential of wind power capacity, the Iran-Af- ghanistan border area is one of the world’s most windy regions.™
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