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52 Opinion
bne December 2017
considered neither fair nor free. Its leader, Muhidding Kabiri, announced in June 2015 that he had gone into self-imposed exile amid repeated threats and fear for his life.
Some suggest Dushanbe’s move to accuse Iran appeared to be part of an ongoing reaction to Iran having invited the exiled Kabiri to a Tehran conference in December 2015. Tajikistan’s initial reaction to the event comprised of customs service restrictions on groceries imports from Iran and a shutdown of a popular Khujand city-based Iranian culture centre.
Others believe the Tajik authorities are driven by the push by Iran's regional arch-rival Saudi Arabia to boost cooperation with Dushanbe. Riyadh's ambassador to Tajikistan, Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Badi, bragged in an interview in Septem- ber of successfully pursuing diplomatic overtures that led
to the “expulsion of Iran and its agents from the country,” Eurasianet reported.
“This is a great victory for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its wise leadership,” he added, as he described the “intensi- fication” of ties with Tajikistan. Al-Badi said the Saudi-led Islamic Development Bank was providing interest-free loans
“Uzbekistan may be in a position to serve as the voice of reason in the Iranians' rows across the region”
for the construction of mosques and educational institu- tions across the Central Asian country. Six religious schools and two universities were planned for launch in the upcom- ing two years, he noted. In May, Saudi Arabia provided a $200mn grant to Tajikistan for the construction of parlia- mentary and government buildings in Dushanbe – one of Tajik President Rahmon’s vanity projects.
It is under these conditions that a partnership with Uzbekistan could be valuable for Iran, since the new Uzbek president has been mending his country’s ties with Central Asian neigh- bours - most notably ending the Tajik-Uzbek dispute over the construction of the Rogun dam. Uzbekistan is both arguably more influential in the region due to its relatively big popula- tion – Tajikistan’s population stands at a mere 8.7mn – and has the capacity to become the beacon of Central Asian synergy, as seen in Mirziyoyev’s repeated efforts to alleviate old rivalries and revive regional economic kinships.
The Turkmen historical gas debts row
Uzbekistan’s flourishing collaboration with Iran’s neighbour Turkmenistan, which includes joint ventures, could also prove useful to the Iranians. It could eventually help fix tensions
between Tehran and Ashgabat, which flared up early in 2017 over Turkmen natural gas exports.
The unresolved dispute between Turkmengaz and Iran traces back to January 1 when Turkmen authorities terminated pipeline gas exports to Northern Iranian provinces lacking the infrastructure to access Iran's plentiful gas, insisting the Iranians owed the company historical debts of more than $1.8bn in dues.
The Turkmen foreign ministry said Iran's debts stemmed from a failure of the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) to abide by the "take or pay" provision of the gas supply contract. NIGC responded that “Turkmengaz has committed numerous viola- tions of the terms of the contract, including in the quality and quantity of deliveries, which are subject to penalties provided in the contract”.
Analysts were left puzzled by the decision to stop gas exports to Iran as it left Turkmenistan with China as its only gas export customer. Iran has throughout this year stressed that it is prepared to deal with Turkmenistan before international arbitrators. Ashgabat has responded with similar threats, but has also claimed that it plans to maintain supplies to Iran at 7bcm in 2017, unchanged from 2016. This did not stop Iran from rejecting Turkmenistan’s proposed gas-swap deal to
get Turkmen gas to Turkey and Iraq, although it has relented enough to allow gas swap arrangements involving supplies for Azerbaijan and Armenia.
As Turkmenistan finds itself in a desperate bind largely of its own making, while Iran may be facing a risk of losing influ- ence in Central Asia to its Middle Eastern rivals, Uzbekistan may be in a position to serve as the voice of reason in the Iranians' rows across the region.
Barriers to cooperation?
No trust issues were brought up during the Uzbek delegation's visit to Iran, even if Uzbekistan could easily find grounds for staying guarded. Though it was at the time closer to Tajikistan, in 2010 Iran interfered on behalf of the Tajiks during a Tajik- Uzbek railroad dispute by warning it would halt all Uzbek freight that passed through Iran.
A May article in The Diplomat cited a US ambassador to Tajiki- stan indicating a likelihood of Iran wanting to build a “Persian axis” along with Afghanistan and Tajikistan. If true, Iran’s choice would imply a preference for more distant relations with countries like Uzbekistan, where, since the country’s independence, the Tajik minority’s identity has been publicly suppressed.
But alignments in Central Asian politics appear to have changed unrecognisably within the past year and reformist Mirziyoyev may end up becoming the missing piece of the Iran-Central Asia jigsaw of alliances.
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