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in other words, the kind of jobs that have a direct impact on the mood of city-dwellers.
The underlying logic of fiscal and political centralization, meanwhile, is unlikely to change. A series of laws (including​ ​parts​ of the constitutional reform) and interviews by members of the security elite this year has suggested that the federal government is worried about initiatives to strengthen regional autonomies. This may partly be a consequence of their memories from the late 1990s when the Federation falling apart was considered a realistic possibility and several regions took their own initiatives, defying Moscow, in the wake of the 1998 financial meltdown. Growing regional unrest in the past two years – triggered in part, ironically, by an increasing centralization of resources in the capital – probably didn’t help either.
Further bills in the legislative pipeline point in the direction of the Kremlin holding the reins. An upcoming law on so-called federal territories, which will allow the federal government to directly administer certain regions, is probably going to erode regional fiscal autonomy even more and will likely create opportunities for big state-owned or state-linked firms to encroach on regions, something that we already see in the field of​ ​waste collection​ (e.g. Igor Chaika’s Khartiya) or digital technology and​ ​surveillance​ (Rostec).
In short, while Mishustin’s reshuffle may make some difference, even a welcome move towards bigger transparency and eliminating inefficient structures, it will hardly be enough to bring about the investment boost envisaged by the national projects. With all his political ambition and credentials of an efficient administrator, Mishustin is able to do enough with the political inertia of the system that points towards more centralization and less room for independent regional initiatives. Moscow’s priority is political stability, not progress.
But is one possible without the other? It is questionable whether this rigid approach will allow the federal government, regions, or even the revamped development institutions to address problems like health care capacity – the pandemic exposed chronic underinvestment, including in Moscow – a growing debt burden on private citizens or regional animosity towards Moscow. The crisis of Russia’s multi-level governance has been lurking behind the scenes in the past decade. The national projects, the pandemic and the return of regional politics allowed it to take centre stage. The central question of the next years is going to be whether the Kremlin is willing to give up some control in exchange for a less risky model of governance and development, or it chooses to go the other way.
2.5 ​ ​US House of Representatives approves military budget with new mild sanctions against Russia
The US military budget for 2021, finally agreed by both houses of Congress, was voted on December 7 in the lower house of representatives.
18 ​RUSSIA Country Report​ January 2021 ​ ​www.intellinews.com