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an under-the-counter payment are largely gone. In part this reflects better training and salaries for relevant officials, in part greater control, especially with the shift of many services to online platforms, and in part a greater public awareness that this is not right.
At the other end of the spectrum is the industrial-scale kleptocracy of oligarchs, big business and senior officials: Putin’s cronies, and their allies and cronies in turn. Individuals may sometimes be kicked out of this exclusive club and face prosecution. In his interview, Krasnov noted ex-minister Mikhail Abyzov and former head of Mari El Leonid Markelov, but his claim that, “the myth about the inaccessibility of high-ranking officials at the federal and regional levels involved in corruption has been destroyed. Bringing them to criminal responsibility is far from uncommon,” is ingenuous, but also ritually necessary.
The biggest beasts in the system remain untouchable, and when lesser kleptocrats are bought to justice, it is because they have already fallen from political grace. Even Mishustin’s efforts at reform have not touched this stratum. The controversial Anatoly Chubais may have lost his position as head of Rusnano, but was given the new position of ‘Special Representative to the President of the Russian Federation for Relations with International Organisations to achieve Sustainable Development Goals’ not only presumably to set a new record in the lengths of official titles but also to suggest he remains off-limits.
Then there is the middle level, the institutional corruption embodied not so much in envelopes of cash, nor in the wholesale theft of companies and industries, but in padded contracts handed between friends, in sweetheart deals, and in over-price invoices signed off for a consideration.
A recent hike in higher-rate income tax is expected to bring in an extra RUB60bn ($820mn). According to Krasnov, the cost of this kind of corruption to the national economy in the first nine months of 2020 was RUB45bn – which, pro-rata over twelve months, comes to the same RUB60bn. This is a big deal, and it is this world of institutional profiteering seems to be in both Krasnov and Mishustin’s sights.
The gamble
Although coronavirus clearly has pushed him a little off track, Mishustin’s core mission is clearly to bring the kind of efficiency he brought to the Federal Tax Service (FNS) to the rest of the government – and in the process drive forward the N ational Projects that Putin considers key legacies.
At the Federal Tax Service (FNS), Mishustin combined administrative reorganisation, a healthy dose of ‘techno-authoritarianism’ and also a crack down not only on many of the scams and loopholes individuals and businesses used to evade tax, but also those of corrupt officials within the service.
There certainly has been a measure of reorganisation. He has a cabinet reshuffled to more closely match his interests and needs, and perhaps more directly important there has been a major reform of Russia’s 40 development institutions such as Rusnano and the Russian Venture Company. Some of these have been quite effective, but others notorious for their wastefulness and
24 RUSSIA Country Report January 2021 www.intellinews.com
