Page 49 - bnemagazine bne_December 2021_20211203.pdf

bne December 2021 Southeast Europe I 49
the DPS and with the Democratic Front acting as the opposition.
Djukanovic, meanwhile, has slowed the approval of new legislation by frequently wielding his presidential veto, only to have it repeatedly overturned by the parliament.
Despite the party’s deep entrenchment in Montenegro, since the change of regime, sackings of DPS-era appointees have chipped away at the party’s control over the state apparatus, while it has also lost control over state broadcaster Radio Television Montenegro (RTCG).
Taylor talks of a “clearout of the old guard” appointed under previous governments, but the downside has been the new appointments are “not necessarily better than the old ones, just different and inexperienced”.
This has been problematic in the context of Montenegro’s EU accession, as Taylor points out: “Negotiations for EU membership had to start again with new people and the fact people were sacked from the bureaucracy had a very poor effect on effectiveness.” Moreover, on the judicial side there were many vacancies that couldn’t be filled because some needed a two-thirds majority
in parliament, which the government doesn’t have.
According to the latest EU enlargement report, the government dismissed 110 members of the teams for negotiations on EU accession chapters, which “significantly weakened” the negotiation structure.
Divisions laid bare in Cetinje
The conflict over the inauguration of the new head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro in September not only pitted the two sides openly against each other but also exposed the deep polarisation in Montenegrin society.
As the road from Podgorica to the historic Montenegrin capital Cetinje filled with cars and buses taking thousands of people to the inauguration of Metropolitan Bishop Joanikije II, Djukanovic arrived in the city vowing to
prevent the inauguration. He accused Krivokapic’s government of sacrificing the security of Montenegrins to serve the Serbian Orthodox Church and to help Serbia regain its control over Podgorica. The DPS is widely understood to have backed protesters, who built a barricade of tyres in an attempt to prevent people reaching the city. Police used tear gas
to break up the protests and arrested dozens of people during the clashes, among them the president’s security advisor Veselin Veljovic.
The government won that confrontation insofar as the inauguration went ahead after the authorities decided to transport Joanikije and the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Porfirije,
to Cetinje by military helicopter.
The incident laid bare the deep divisions within Montenegro, where two-thirds
of the country’s population of just over 620,000 is Orthodox Christian and the main church is the Serbian Orthodox Church. A separate Montenegrin Orthodox Church was set up in 1993
but has not been recognised by other Orthodox Christian communities to date.
“The events in Cetinje were only part of a much longer and complex story that pre-dates the controversy over the Law on Religious Freedoms. But what was evident was that the political environment had become more polarised and radicalised, and certainly more so than at any point since Montenegro became independent in 2006,” says Morrison.
Staying together?
While the dramatic events in Cetinje unfolded, Montenegro was in the process of emerging from the deep economic crisis this year, though it
isn’t expected to recover fully from the contraction in 2020 for at least another year. The government expects the 2022 budget deficit to reach a record-high €5.3bn, or 3.87% of GDP, as spending on healthcare and other areas is set to remain high. Montenegro has by no means left the coronavirus pandemic behind; after opening up to tourism in the summer, this autumn it has suffered a severe new wave of the pandemic, which forced the authorities to cancel
New Year’s Eve celebrations and all other mass gatherings.
Jockeying for position continues within the fractious ruling coalition. In the latest development on November 22, the Democratic Front proposed removing Krivokapic and appointing a new government that includes members of the ruling coalition parties.
“The enthronement of Joanikije might have been seen as a victory for the parties and coalitions that comprise
the new government, but in the wake of it tensions between them were evident again,” comments Morrison. “That said, while there may be disagreements, they all have an interest in remaining united and keeping the DPS out of power. This will probably ensure that, however fragile, the governing coalition will find a way to stay together because the one thing that united them during the August 2020 elections was their shared antipathy towards the DPS.”
The next electoral test of the relative popularity of the current ruling parties and Djukanovic’s DPS will be the presidential election in 2023. This will be a chance for voters to compare the achievements of the current government during what will by then be almost three years in office (assuming it survives) against the record of the previous DPS- led administrations.
In the meantime, there are plenty
of opportunities for the new guard
to further tarnish the reputation of Djukanovic and his party as they continue to probe suspected corruption under previous governments. Most recently, Montenegro’s specialised prosecution launched a probe into allegations by Albanian oil businessman Rezart Taci that Djukanovic has been participating in an international money laundering scheme – a claim denied by Djukanovic. The president is also being probed over revelations in the Pandora Papers that he and his son Blazo funnelled money to offshore accounts via a complicated network of companies in the UK, Switzerland, the British Virgin Islands, Panama and Gibraltar.
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